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This Article discusses the normative trajectory of in-
ternational obligations assumed by Southeast Asian
countries (particularly the Organizational Purposes
that mandate compliance with international treaties,
human rights and democratic freedoms), and the inev-
itable emergence of a body of discrete "ASEAN Law"
arising from the combined legislative functions of the
ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN Political, Economic
and Social Communities. I discuss several immediate
and short-term challenges from the increased consti-
tutionalization of international obligations, such as:
1) the problem of incorporation (or lack of direct ef-fect) and the remaining dependence of some Southeast
Asian states on their respective constitutional mecha-
nisms to transform international obligations into bind-
ing constitutional or statutory obligations; 2) the
problem of hybridity and normative transplantation,
which I illustrate in the interpretive issues regarding
the final text of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement, which draws some provisions from GATT
1994 and contains language similar to the U.S. and
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German Model Bilateral Inevestment Treaties; and 3)
the problem of diffuse or insufficient judicial oversight
within ASEAN, seen through lingering dependence on
national court implementation despite the regional ef-
fort at standardization of legal norms on specific are-
as of trade, security and human rights. I conclude
that leaving these problems unaddressed could impede
Southeast Asia's vast potential to contribute to the
project of constitutionalizing international law.
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"[W]ithout a contract among nations peace can neither be
inaugurated nor guaranteed." Immanuel Kant'
INTRODUCTION
Since its entry into force on December 15, 2008,2 the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Charter has triggered
1. IMMANUEL KANT, To PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH 13 (Ted
Humphrey trans., Hackett Publishing Co. Inc., 2003) (1795).
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various fundamental questions from public law and international rela-
tions scholars-ranging from issues such as the attribution of inter-
governmental acts to ASEAN Member States as opposed to ASEAN
as an international organization, the powers of pre-existing as op-
posed to future ASEAN institutions and most importantly, the respec-
tive competencies retained or ceded by its Member States to the
"new" ASEAN. 3
Before the entry into force of its new charter, ASEAN was
known as a loose intergovernmental cooperation between ten South-
east Asian states-the original five ASEAN Members (Malaysia, In-
donesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore), which later ex-
panded to include the more recent "CMLV" group of States
(Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam), as well as Brunei. 4 Under
the new Charter, however, ASEAN Member States have expressly
committed themselves to "take all necessary measures, including the
enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively imple-
ment the provisions of this Charter, and to comply with all obliga-
tions of membership." 5 While ASEAN Member States obligated
themselves to "reaffirm and adhere to the fundamental principles
contained in the declarations, agreements, conventions, concords,
treaties, and other instruments of ASEAN," 6 they also bound them-
selves to act according to specific ASEAN Principles.7 The fourteen
ASEAN Charter Principles not only include pre-Charter norms from
the formative instruments underlying ASEAN as an intergovernmen-
tal cooperation of States (such as the emphasis on respect for national
2. ASEAN Charter Overview, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/
21861.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2010); Press Release, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Embarks
on a New Era-ASEAN Charter Fully Ratified (Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/22022.htm.
3. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, The ASEAN Charter: An Opportunity Missed or
One that Cannot Be Missed?, 2008 SE. ASIAN AFF. 71; Simon Chesterman, Does ASEAN
Exist? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations as an International Legal Person, 12
SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 199, 204-07 (2008); Paul J. Davidson, The Role ofInternational Law in
the Governance ofInternational Economic Relations in ASEAN, 12 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 213,
218-23 (2008); Simon S.C. Tay, The ASEAN Charter: Between National Sovereignty and
the Region's Constitutional Moment, 12 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 158-62 (2008).
4. For a brief history of Southeast Asian regionalism, see Diane A. Desierto,
Postcolonial International Law Discourses on Regional Developments in South and
Southeast Asia, 36 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 388, 413-31 (2008).
5. Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations art. 5(2), Nov. 20, 2007
[hereinafter ASEAN Charter].
6. Id. art. 2(1).
7. Id. art. 2(2).
270 [49:268
ASEAN'S CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference and renunciation of
aggression), but also formally set as key ASEAN Principles contem-
porary multilateral norms of free trade, democratic government and
the promotion and protection of human rights.8
Over two years after the entry into force of the ASEAN Char-
ter, the normative and institutional transition of ASEAN from a loose
intergovernmental cooperation to a formal international organization
remains very much a complex process. Recent crises facing ASEAN
Member States, such as the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute over
8. See Diane A. Desierto, Universalizing Core Human Rights in the "New" ASEAN:
A Reassessment of Culture and Development Justifications Against the Global Rejection of
Impunity, 1 GOTTINGEN J. OF INT'L L. 77, 77-114 (2009) (discussing the wider reach of
ASEAN Charter norms particularly in promoting human rights). The ASEAN Charter lists
the fourteen key principles of the organization:
(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity,
and national identity of all ASEAN Member States;
(b) shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional
peace, security, and prosperity;
(c) renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force or other actions
in any manner inconsistent with international law;
(d) reliance on peaceful settlement of disputes;
(e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States;
(f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence
free from external interference, subversion and coercion;
(g) enhanced consultations on matters seriously affecting the common interest
of ASEAN;
(h) adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of
democracy and constitutional government;
(i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human
rights, and the promotion of social justice;
() upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including
international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States;
(k) abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of
its territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN State
or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States;
(1) respect for the different cultures, languages and religions of the peoples of
ASEAN, while emphasizing their common values in the spirit of unity in
diversity;
(m) the centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and
cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-looking,
inclusive and non-discriminatory; and
(n) adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN's rules-based regimes
for effective implementation of economic commitments and progressive
reduction towards elimination of all barriers to regional economic
integration, in a market-driven economy.
ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 2(2)(a)-(n).
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areas in the vicinity of Preah Vihear;9 Thailand's bloody political
demonstrations between forces of Thaksin Shinawatra's "red shirt"
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) and the
"yellow shirt" People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD);lo the Philip-
pines' experience from 2009 to 2010 with natural disasters, extraju-
dicial killings and states of emergency;" and the 2010 elections of
Myanmar, which excluded the recently released democratic opposi-
tion leader leader Aung San Suu Kyi; 12 all highlight the need for re-
invigorated discussion of the role and competencies of ASEAN under
its new charter, 13 particularly the constitutional dimensions of the
ASEAN Charter on the relationship between ASEAN and its Mem-
ber States. 14
For the purposes of this Article, I refer to "constitutionaliza-
tion" only in a specific limited sense, in order to describe the passage
9. Olivia Rondonuwu, ASEAN Seeks Peaceful End to Thai-Cambodian Conflict,
REUTERS, Feb. 22, 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE7 ILIAC
20110222.
10. Profile: Thailand's Reds and Yellows, BBC NEWS, Apr. 20, 2010, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/8004306.stm.
11. David McNeill, Philippines Declares State of Emergency After 46 Are Killed in
Election Bloodbath, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Nov. 25, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk
/news/world/asia/philippines-declares-state-of-emergency-after-46-are-killed-in-election-
bloodbath-1826943.html; Philip Tubeza, UN on RP Disasters: Worst Is Yet To Come,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 2009, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/ inquirerheadlines/
nation/view/20091028-23263 1/UN-on-RP-disasters-Worst-yet-to-come. See generally
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "THEY OWN THE PEOPLE": THE AMPATUANS, STATE-BACKED
MILITIAS, AND KILLINGS IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/
en/reports/2010/11/16/they-own-people-0.
12. See UN Condemns Burma's Human Rights and Unfair Elections, BBC NEWS, Nov.
18, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific- 11793615.
13. See Jiirgen Haacke, The Myanmar Imbroglio and ASEAN: Heading Towards the
2010 Elections, 86 INT'L AFF. 153, 153-74 (2010); Mazwin Nik Anis, Disasters Main Topic
at ASEAN Meet, THE STAR ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2010, http://thestar.com.my/news/
story.asp?file=/2010/10/28/nation/7314644&sec-nation; Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Fall-Out
of the Thai Political Crisis on ASEAN, THE NATION, Apr. 19, 2010,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/04/19/opinion/The-fall-out-of-the-Thai-
political-crisis-on-Asean-30127385.html.
14. The National University of Singapore, through its Centre for International Law
(CIL), has recently launched its research project on ASEAN Legal Integration. The project
is headed by Professor Joseph Weiler of New York University and Professor Michael
Ewing-Chow of the National University of Singapore. See Integration through Law: The
ASEAN Way in a Comparative Context, CTR. FOR INT'L L. (Oct. 12, 2009),
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/1 0/Mission-Statement-CIL-ASEAN-
Integration-through-Law-Project-12-Oct-2009 1.pdf.
272 [49:268
ASEAN'S CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
of the ASEAN Charter and its ongoing constitutive decision-making
processes, transforming ASEAN from a loose cooperation of South-
east Asian states into an integrated organization with international le-
gal personality.15 To the extent that "constitutionalization" seeks to
identify political arrangements in the international plane that func-
tionally determine (the "legislative" function), apply (the "executive"
function) or interpret (the "judicial" function) a set of common and
distinguishable norms,16 the "rules of recognition" in the internation-
al legal regime created by the new ASEAN Charter should also be
sketched.17 This descriptive approach accepts the notion of a "tradi-
tional understanding of international organizations' founding docu-
ment as a hybrid treaty-constitution, [which does not] rely on any
material, value-loaded (constitutionalist) principles, but merely on
the fact that the founding treaties established institutional structures,
delineated the competences of the organization and defined the terms
of membership."18 As I discuss in the conclusion of this Article,
however, the ideological over-inclusiveness of the ASEAN Charter
15. For an overview of the fundamental changes and transition of ASEAN as a loose
cooperation of States to a formal international organization, see Desierto, supra note 4, at
387-431.
16. For a useful review of the common content to the theory of constitutionalization in
international law, see Susan C. Breau, The Constitutionalization of the International Legal
Order, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 545, 545-61 (2008).
17. See G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1983)
(defining a "rule of recognition" as "a rule specifying some feature or features possession of
which by a suggested rule is taken as conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the
group to be supported by the social pressures it exerts"). See also Nicholas Onuf, The
Constitution of International Society, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1994) (identifying "rules of
recognition" in the international legal regime using a constructivist method, asserting that
"prescriptive statements [that enjoy] some considerable degree of formality and institutional
support are legal"). Onuf states:
To view constitution as process makes change the subject without making
theory the objective. As presented in these pages, constructivism is not a
theory. Its terms are deliberately inclusive, and it acknowledges change-
change as a pervasive and inevitable feature of social construction-in the very
definition of those terms. Many, perhaps most, deeds are responses to rules.
Rules are regulative because agents usually choose to follow them, and
continuity and stability rather than change is the result. Those same rules are
constitutive because they do not provide agents with choices. Every time
agents choose to follow a rule, they change it-they strengthen the rule-by
making it more likely that they and others will follow the rule in the future.
Every time agents choose not to follow a rule, they change the rule by
weakening it and in so doing they may well contribute to the constitution of
some new rule. (Italics in the original.)
Id. at 18.
18. Anne Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 204 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 2009).
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presages a subtle paradigm shift towards deliberate constitutionaliza-
tion of a distinct regional identity, one governed by liberal democrat-
ic values in the Southeast Asian region. More than any other nuance
to the ASEAN Charter era, it is this shift that perhaps should not be
overlooked in analyzing the trajectory of ASEAN's institutional and
normative development as a regional organization.
I also submit that the complex marriage of political and legal
issues affecting different governance areas under the new charter-
based organization of Southeast Asian states should provoke us to
search for the authoritative decision-making processes within this
new regional order. When ASEAN confronts urgent regional issues
regarding international investment and trade, human rights and col-
lective security, environment, religion and cultural diversity, it does
so now not only as a rules-based organization, but also as a concrete
polity made up of state and non-state constituencies. This should af-
fect not just the assessment of usual criticisms against ASEAN (espe-
cially on questions of human rights, lack of transparency and ac-
countability for non-compliance with international obligations), 19 but
also more importantly, the understanding of how ASEAN decision-
makers now reach their conclusions of legality within the charter
framework, processes and institutions.
Unlike the paradigm of the European Union and its well-
integrated institutions, ASEAN integration is evidently as cautious as
it is landmark. It took forty years working together as a loose inter-
national cooperation before Southeast Asian states agreed to constitu-
tionalize their international legal obligations inter se in the ASEAN
Charter.20 As this Article will show, the Southeast Asian region ap-
pears to be evolving towards the consolidation of "ASEAN Law,"
but it does so with some subsisting ambivalence among the ASEAN
membership on the process of public interactions between the Mem-
ber States' domestic legal systems and the new ASEAN institutions.
Conflicting views on ASEAN's new mandate and role for the region
are best illustrated by the gap between the actual constitutive deci-
sions taken to create the ASEAN Charter institutions and the choice
to leave critical organizational matters for future determination or
subsequent agreement (such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental
19. For recent critiques on the charter-based ASEAN on human rights compliance
issues, see John Arendshorst, Note, The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human
Rights, and the ASEAN Charter, 8 Nw. UNIV. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 102, 112-15 (2009); see
also Hao Duy Phan, A Blueprint for a Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 384, 386-88 (2009).
20. See Desierto, supra note 8, at 87-91.
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Commission on Human Rights and the ASEAN Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, whose respective constitutive instruments passed long
after the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter). While these deci-
sions were justified as part of the contingent realities of the charter-
negotiating process, 21 they do pose significant constitutional ambi-
guities for the Southeast Asian community as well as for third-party
observers.
A final clarification on the use of term "constitutionalization"
in this Article: as deployed in the structural analysis of the ASEAN
Charter in this article, I do not intend to approximate the full breadth
of the conceptual framework pushed by "constitutionalization" pro-
ponents. Jiirgen Habermas described constitutionalization of interna-
tional law as an "alternative to the evolution of a [completely Kanti-
an] cosmopolitan constitution," 22 where "international institutions
21. Pengirna Dato Paduka Osman Patra, Heart Labour, in THE MAKING OF THE
ASEAN CHARTER 6-8 (Tommy Koh et al. eds., 2009); Walter Woon, The ASEAN Charter
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, in THE MAKING OF THE ASEAN CHARTER supra.
22. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 115 (Ciaran Cronin ed. & trans., 2006).
See Garrett Wallace Brown, Kantian Cosmopolitan Law and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan
Constitution, 27 HIST. OF POL. THOUGHT 661, 672 (2006). Brown states:
In The Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant writes that "a constitution
allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which
ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all the other[s],
is at all events a necessary idea which must be made the basis not only of the
first outline of a political constitution but of all laws as well." By constitution,
we can understand that Kant does not specifically mean a written political
document, but rather is alluding to the underlying normative principles that
underwrite a juridical condition of mutual public right. In this regard, a
constitution refers to the totality of laws that should be publicized so as to
create a rightful condition of mutual freedom between individuals, states and
associations. What is to be constituted within a Kantian system of laws is the
idea that the mutual protection of individual freedom is paramount for the
creation of a condition of universal justice and that all subsequent laws should
reflect a commitment to this corresponding universal condition of public right.
Kant defines the relationship between public right and his constitutionalism as:
The sum of laws which need to be promulgated generally in order to
bring about a rightful condition is public right. -Public right is
therefore a system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human
beings, or for a multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one
another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a
constitution (constitutio), so that they may enjoy what is laid down as
right.
We can understand Kant to mean that these principles should not only be the
concern of domestic constitutions, but also a requirement of all laws, which
should ultimately culminate in a cosmopolitan constitution. Since humanity has
an "original possession of the earth in common" and since we are bounded by
spherical cohabitation, any domestic and international constitution "will always
remain provisional unless this contract extends to the entire human race."
Id. (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 89 (M. Gregor ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1797)).
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form an increasingly dense network and nation-States lose compe-
tences." 23 This definition, when applied to international law, under-
standably evokes skepticism from international legal scholars, due to
connotations of imposed uniformity, eroded sovereignties and the
collapse of traditional distinctions between constitutional processes
and international legal processes.24 International Court of Justice
Judge Bruno Simma considers the "constitutionalization" descriptor
"misleading," when all that it allegedly conveys is a contemporary
"widening and thickening of international law" norms, organizations
23. Jiirgen Habermas, The Constitutionalization of International Law and the
Legitimation of Problems of a Constitution for World Society, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 444, 444
(2008). For a recent description of the Kantian-Habermasian paradigm, see Robert J.
Delahunty and John Yoo, The Philosophy of International Law: Kant, Habermas, and
Democratic Peace, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 437, 452-53 (2010). Delahunty and Yoo state:
Habermas' version of the "Kantian project" seeks, like that of Kant himself, to
transform or "constitutionalize" classic, state-centered public international law.
The "constitutionalization" of international law, Habermas argues, would
construct an international legal order that "renders war as a legitimate means of
resolving conflicts, indeed war as such, impossible, because there cannot be
'external' conflicts within a globally inclusive commonwealth. What had
hitherto been military conflicts would assume the character of police actions
and operations of criminal justice." In other words, under a
"constitutionalized" international system, states would no longer be able to
exercise the "right" to go to war-the "core component" of classic public
international law. The question then, of course, becomes how such a
"constitutionalized" international order is to be achieved.
Even more firmly than Kant, Habermas rejects the possibility of bringing about
the "legal pacification of world society by repressive means, that is, through a
despotic monopoly of power." Neither Kant nor Habermas, therefore, claims
that perpetual peace can only be achieved through creating a world-state, even
of a federal kind. In place of that proposal, Habermas invokes Kant's "core
innovation" which was to envision "the transformation of international law as a
law of states into cosmopolitan law as a law of individuals." Instead of being
merely the citizens of their own states, individuals would be viewed as
members of a "cosmopolitan commonwealth," and their "civil rights" would
"penetrate international relations too." This transformation, Habermas
suggests, would mean more than merely codifying certain basic legal rights that
anyone, whether a citizen or not, might claim against any state. It would entail
a fundamental change, not only in the relations between states and rights-
bearing individuals, but also between states and other states. World citizenship
would necessitate some form of world legal order-an order that subordinated
the legal systems of particular states to a globalized legal system. To realize the
idea of world citizenship, therefore, states would have to sacrifice not only their
internal, but also their external, sovereignty to "a higher authority."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
24. See Michael Wood, Constitutionalization ofInternational Law: A Sceptical Voice,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL ORDER AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF COLIN WARBRICK 85, 85-98 (Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad & Michael Bohlander
eds., 2009).
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and tribunals.25 Scholars also differ on the potential use and applica-
tion of tools of constitutional analysis into the analysis of contempo-
rary (and often specialized) international legal structures and norms
in various fields such as international trade, investment and dispute
settlement.26 For many of its proponents, however, constitutionaliza-
tion is an opportunity to draw from a conceptual framework that
views international law from the lens of public authority, shared
normativity and the assumption of legislative, executive and judicial
functions by different international institutions.27 It is this particular
mode of framing the problematique for a charter-based international
organization that I will subscribe to in this Article.
Constitutionalization also has its "thick" and "thin" ver-
sions.28 "Thick" constitutionalism in international law accepts the
decentralized nature of the international system, but also stresses the
institutionally based process of international governance created by
the collective activities of the United Nations, regional organizations,
intergovernmental networks and non-state or non-profit international
groups and alliances. Such modem institutions perform basic consti-
tutive functions, advancing a liberal democratic order premised on a
set of universally held values and norms defined by treaties, custom-
25. Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a
Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 265, 297 (2009).
26. See FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUTA, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AN
EVOLVING GLOBAL SOCIETY 124-27 (2004); Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in
International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany, 47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 223, 224-
29 (2006); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO's "Constitution" and the
Discipline ofInternational Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647, 650-55 (2006); Frank Schorkopf &
Christian Walter, Elements of Constitutionalization: Multilevel Structures of Human Rights
Protection in General International and WTO-Law, 4 GERMAN L. J. 1359, 1359-74 (2003),
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pagelD=1 1&artlD=348.
27. See Bogdandy, supra, note 26, at 230-33, 237-40; Deborah Z. Cass, The
"Constitutionalization" of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the
Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 39 (2001);
Bardo Fassbender, The Meaning of International Constitutional Law, in TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS (Nicholas Tsagourias ed.,
2007); Matthias Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standard
Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1865, 1868-
71 (2008); Andrea Hamann & Helene Ruiz-Fabri, Transnational Networks and
Constitutionalism, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 481, 484-85, 489-95 (July-Oct. 2008); Jan Klabbers,
Setting the Scene, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18,
3-44; Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT'L. COMP. L. Q. 51, 51-
54, 56-58 (2006).
28. Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon, Introduction-Global Constitutionalism from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385, 393 (2009).
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ary international law and the general practice of States and non-state
actors. 29 This type of "intemationalized" constitutionalism remains
less robust than its domestic counterpart:
All it should strive for is the establishment and
maintenance of an international order in which basic
rights and interest of individuals and communities are
acknowledged, and conflicting claims peacefully set-
tled. Given the diversity of our world, such order can
only be based on a framework which in the history of
political ideas we have come to label constitutional. 30
Ultimately, "thick" constitutionalists visualize modem inter-
national law to be moving towards the realization of the Kantian-
Habermasian paradigm of international public order,31 where a feder-
ation of closely cooperating liberal democracies execute, implement
and interpret a narrow (but potentially widening) set of common in-
ternational norms.
On the other hand, the "thin" version of constitutionalization
in international law does not extend its theoretical objectives to the
liberal-democratic Kantian-Habermasian paradigm. Instead, "thin"
constitutionalists limit the project of constitutionalization in intema-
tional law under a pluralist perspective, one that does not espouse
particular values or normative positions a priori. Alec Stone Sweet,
for example, operationally defines a constitution as "a body of meta-
29. For varying applications of this proposal, see Anne van Aaken, Defragmentation of
Public International Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 483 (2009); Daniel Bodansky, Is There an International
Environmental Constitution?, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 565 (2009); Karolina Milewicz,
Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalism: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 16 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413 (2009); Beth Simmons, Civil Rights in International Law:
Compliance with Aspects of an "International Bill of Rights", 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 437 (2009). For the seminal work on the architecture of transgovernmental networks
and how they directly influence the spread of liberal internationalism, see ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton Univ. Press 2004); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Governmental
Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1041 (2003).
30. BARDO FASSBENDER, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 57 (2009).
31. See Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio Dellavalle, Universalism Renewed:
Habermas' Theory of International Order in Light of Competing Paradigms, 10 GERMAN
L.J. 5, 25-29 (2009).
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norms, those higher-order legal rules and principles that specify how
all other lower-order legal norms are to be produced, applied, en-
forced, and interpreted. Meta-norms constitute political systems in
perpetuity." 32  Constitutionalization, in his view, represents "the
commitment on the part of any given political community to be gov-
erned by constitutional rules and principles ... [where] constitution-
alism is a variable." 33 Legal or constitutional pluralism does not pre-
scribe ex ante that such meta-norms necessarily adopt liberal
democratic values, human rights treaties or jus cogens norms, alt-
hough the practices of some international regimes (such as the Euro-
pean Union) might be inclined towards them.34
In this Article, I first use the "thin" version of constitutionali-
zation to highlight the structural and functional political arrange-
ments now extant from the ASEAN Charter. I then draw insights
from the "thick" version of constitutionalization-particularly its de-
liberate emphasis of a definite liberal democratic vision for a given
constitutional order-by contrasting the ASEAN Charter's seemingly
more liberal and pro-democratic normative trajectory with the current
state of ASEAN institutions' structural design. While the ASEAN
system has developed under the Charter to the point that there are
discernible executive, legislative and judicial functions assumed
within the Charter system and its currently evolving bureaucracy, we
should also consider several deep structural issues related to such
functions. From the executive standpoint, how do we ensure the di-
rect effect of ASEAN instruments and ASEAN Summit decisions in
individual Member States? Legislatively, how do we reconcile a vast
body of ASEAN treaties, agreements and instruments generated over
forty years, and differentially applicable to public and private sectors,
with future ASEAN Summit decisions and directives issued in rela-
tion to ASEAN Communities' recommendations? And perhaps most
controversially, do Southeast Asian states and their respective con-
stituencies have recourse to any ex post review of ASEAN policies
and decisions, through dispute settlement or any form of judicial
oversight?
This Article offers some tentative answers to these broad
questions, and suggests areas for further research. As much as possi-
ble, I confine the analysis to legal questions based on the ASEAN
32. Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes,
16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 626 (2009).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 632. See also Thomas Cottier, Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and
Moral Conflict, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 647, 655-58 (2009).
2011] 279
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [
Charter and a voluminous body of related instruments, treaties and
practices. When necessary, however, I also point out nascent policy
areas that cannot be discussed in depth at this point in time, since the
Charter-based ASEAN is only in its third year of existence as an in-
ternational organization with legal personality.35 Part I thus presents
a descriptive examination of ASEAN Charter institutions and how
they respectively assume executive, legislative and judicial functions
in relation to Southeast Asian governance. I delineate each of these
functions from the pre-Charter era of ASEAN as an international co-
operation under the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC),
and point out fundamental differences in scope, competencies and
powers now possessed by ASEAN Charter institutions such as the
ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Communities, the ASEAN Coordinat-
ing Council, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Committee of Perma-
nent Representatives. I show that, unlike the European model of ver-
tical integration, the constitutionalization of international law in
ASEAN adopts a horizontal embeddedness where national govern-
ments and domestic institutions maintain preexisting linkages to
ASEAN institutions, under an "abbreviated" hierarchy with the
ASEAN Summit as the supreme governing body of the organiza-
tion.36 The result is a dispersed and diffuse ASEAN bureaucracy,
which, while highly dependent on Member State governments for
funding and operational implementation, nonetheless recognizes sub-
sidiarity in agenda setting, information dissemination, and perfor-
mance monitoring with counterpart administrative agencies and civil
society groups in the ASEAN Political, Economic and Socio-Cultural
Communities.
Part II proceeds to discuss several immediate and short-term
challenges from the increased constitutionalization of international
obligations under the ASEAN Charter framework, such as: 1) the
problem of incorporation (or lack of direct effect), and the remaining
dependence of some Southeast Asian states on their respective con-
stitutional mechanisms to transform international obligations into
binding constitutional or statutory obligations; 2) the problem of hy-
brid interpretation (or the need for judicial sensitivity to the compara-
tive jurisprudence generated by other national courts in Southeast
35. However, note the argument that the organization's legal status was already in
existence before the ASEAN Charter. See Chesterman, supra, note 3, at 204-07.
36. For a concise summary of the legal hierarchy from the EU integration model, see
Patricia Luiza Kegel & Mohamed Amal, The Problem of Legal Implementation and
Sovereignty, in ELEMENTS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH
209 (Ariane Ksler & Martin Zimmek eds., 2008).
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Asia), which I problematize through the as yet undefined role of do-
mestic courts in the enforcement of future arbitral awards arising
from disputes involving the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement; and 3) the problem of diffuse or insufficient judicial
oversight within ASEAN, seen from the Charter's continuing de-
pendence on national governments or national courts despite the re-
gional effort at standardization of legal norms on specific areas of
trade, security and human rights. The incremental development and
unclear mandates of some of the new ASEAN institutions (such as
the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights which
was subsequently created under future Terms of Reference as provid-
ed for in the Charter) likewise affect the project of constitutionaliza-
tion, since ASEAN decision-makers become vulnerable to political
suasion in designing these institutions, rather than pre-committing
them to a settled mandate under the ASEAN Charter. If left un-
addressed, these problems could seriously impede the potential for
thicker constitutionalization of international law in ASEAN.
Finally, the Conclusion contends that while the ASEAN
Charter has boldly embarked on an ideologically driven project of
constitutionalization of international law, its concept of legality will
ultimately be influenced by the constitutive and authoritative deci-
sions of ASEAN's governing institutions. If the pre-Charter ASEAN
was a loose agglomeration of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral ar-
rangements among Southeast Asian states expressed in numerous
treaties, instruments and agreements, ASEAN under its new Charter
now creates a variable admixture of legally binding but potentially
unenforceable international obligations for its membership. Since
Article 52 of the ASEAN Charter provides for legal continuity with
pre-Charter ASEAN "treaties, conventions, agreements, concords,
declarations, protocols, and other ASEAN instruments," 37 ASEAN
decision-makers thus crucially determine and locate "ASEAN Law"
for Southeast Asian states and their respective constituencies. Con-
sidering the ASEAN Charter's emphasis on further developing the
concept of a "Southeast Asian" identity under shared values, princi-
ples and purposes, its organizational aspirations inevitably lean to-
wards a thick version of the constitutionalization of international law.
At this point in time, the main obstacle to the realization of ASEAN's
project of constitutionalization lies in building and enforcing
"ASEAN Law" in genuine accord with the Charter's Organizational
Purposes. The challenge remains for Southeast Asian states to trans-
late these normative aspirations into effective decisions.
37. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 52(1).
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II. FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUTIONALIZATION IN THE ASEAN
CHARTER
A. Pre-Charter ASEAN
The main constitutive documents of the pre-Charter ASEAN
are the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the 1967
ASEAN Bangkok Declaration.38 Both instruments clearly defined
the terms of Southeast Asian regional economic, political and socio-
cultural cooperation under an intergovernmental framework operat-
ing through Member States' consensus vote (otherwise known as the
"ASEAN Way"). 39 The 1967 ASEAN Bangkok Declaration provid-
ed for narrow institutional machinery, governed by Southeast Asian
governments through their respective foreign ministers at Annual
Meetings and Special Meetings. Pending these Annual and/or Spe-
cial Meetings, ASEAN would undertake implementation of the re-
gion's cooperation agenda through a semi-permanent administrative
cohort of Standing Committees, ad hoc Committees and Permanent
Committees of Specialists, working alongside counterpart National
Secretariats in ASEAN Member States.40 The 1976 TAC sealed the
38. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, 1023 U.N.T.S.
320, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm; The ASEAN Declaration, Aug. 8,
1967, http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter ASEAN
Bangkok Declaration].
39. For an overview of pre-Charter ASEAN's consensus decision-making in foreign
policy, see DAVID H. CAPIE & PAUL M. EVANS, THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY LEXICON 136-
46 (2002); SHAUN NARINE, EXPLAINING ASEAN: REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 9-38
(2002); Tobias Ingo Nischalke, Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Cooperation: The
"ASEAN Way", a Real Spirit or Phantom?, 22 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 89 (2000).
40. The ASEAN Bangkok Declaration states:
THIRD, that to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery
shall be established:
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation
and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings
of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required.
(b) A Standing committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign
Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its
members the accredited Ambassadors of the other member
countries, to carry on the work of the Association in between
Meetings of Foreign Ministers. Ad-Hoc Committees and
Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific
subjects.
(c) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the
work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the
Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing
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best-efforts nature of this intergovernmental framework, where the
ASEAN Member States "strive to achieve the closest cooperation on
the widest scale."41 The scope of cooperation provided for under the
1976 TAC spanned economic, social, technical, scientific, adminis-
trative and security concerns of the Southeast Asian region.42 Coop-
eration is ultimately limited by ASEAN's overarching principles of
"[m]utual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territo-
rial integrity and national identity of all nations," "[t]he right of every
State to lead its national existence free from external interference,
subversion or coercion," "[n]on-interference in the internal affairs of
one another," "[s]ettlement of differences or disputes by peaceful
means," "[r] enunciation of the threat or use of force" and "[e]ffective
cooperation." 43 Most importantly, the 1976 TAC stressed the pacific
settlement of disputes firstly through direct ministerial negotiations. 44
Should negotiations fail, ASEAN Member States could undertake
dispute resolution through "good offices, mediation, inquiry or con-
ciliation," 45 informal or ad hoc third-party assistance of a fellow
Member State46 or recourse to any of the modes of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes under the Charter of the United Nations.47
ASEAN endured as a regional cooperation for over forty
years, a period remarkable for the absence (or containment) of politi-
cal security tensions between ASEAN Member States,48 the steady
economic development of the original five ASEAN Members (Sin-
gapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) and the
relatively recent admission of other Southeast Asian states (Cambo-
Committee and such other committees as may hereafter be
established.
ASEAN Bangkok Declaration, supra note 38, para. 3.
41. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, supra note 38, art. 8.
42. Id. arts. 7-8.
43. Id. arts. 2(a)-2(f).
44. Id. art. 14.
45. Id. art. 15.
46. Id. art. 16.
47. Id. art. 17.
48. With the endorsement of the UN Security Council, ASEAN has been leading
mediation efforts with respect to the eruption of a border dispute in 2011 between ASEAN
Member-States, Thailand and Cambodia. See Press Release, ASEAN Secretariat, Historic
Firsts: ASEAN Efforts on Cambodian-Thai Conflict Endorsed by UNSC, Feb, 21, 2011
available at http://www.aseansec.org/25924.htm; Thailand-Cambodia Border Dispute: UN
Calls for Truce, BBC NEWS, Feb, 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
12448622.
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dia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, otherwise known in ASEAN doc-
umentation as the CMLV group, as well as Brunei).49 During this
time, ASEAN institutions developed through a gradual accretion pro-
cess created piecemeal by bilateral, trilateral and multilateral negotia-
tions formalized in separate international treaties, agreements, in-
struments, protocols and communiqu6s.50  Cooperation was
implemented through regulatory entrenchment, which relied on the
establishment of inter-departmental or inter-agency administrative
networks between Southeast Asian states.
Over the forty years of ASEAN's existence as a regional co-
operation, ASEAN intergovernmental policies flourished in the eco-
nomic, political-security, socio-cultural, environmental, transport and
communication sectors. Economic cooperation was driven primarily
by the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 51 which administered the
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) mechanism among
ASEAN Member States alongside the rules of multilateral trade in
GATT 1994. Many of the key legal instruments on ASEAN econom-
ic cooperation would later be harmonized, supplemented or super-
49. See SHAUN NARINE, EXPLAINING ASEAN: REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 113-
23 (2002).
50. See ASEAN's COOPERATIVE SECURITY ENTERPRISE: NORMS AND INTERESTS IN THE
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (Hiro Katsumata ed., 2009); THE ASEAN: THIRTY YEARS AND
BEYOND (Maria Lourdes, Aranal Sereno & Joseph Sedfrey Santiago, eds., 1997); MARK
BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC: ASEAN, APEC, AND BEYOND 17-36, 56-73
(2009); MULTILATERAL TREATIES BETWEEN ASEAN COUNTRIES (Visu Sinnadurai ed., 1986).
51. For key instruments of economic cooperation, see, for example, First Protocol to
Amend the Protocol on Special Arrangements on Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products,
Sept. 3, 2004, http://www.aseansec.org/22976.pdf; Protocol Regarding the Implementation
of the CEPT Temporary Exclusion List, Nov. 23, 2000, http://www.aseansec.org/12365.htm;
Protocol on the Special Arrangement for Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products, Sept. 30,
1999, http://www.aseansec.org/1207.htm; ASEAN Framework Agreement on the
Facilitation of Goods in Transit, Dec. 16, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 502, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/7377.htm; Protocol to Amend the Agreement on ASEAN
Preferential Trading Arrangement, Dec. 15 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1086, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/12373.htm; Protocol for the Accession of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam to the Framework Agreements on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Dec.
15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1093, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12370.htm; Protocol to
Amend the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN
Free Trade Area, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1084, available at http://www.aseansec.org/
12371.htm; Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreements on Enhancing ASEAN
Economic Cooperation, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1093, available at http://www.aseansec.
org/12369.htm; Framework Agreements on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation,
Singapore, Jan. 28 1992, 31 I.L.M. 506, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12374.htm;
Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade
Area, Jan. 28 1992, 31 I.L.M. 513, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12375.htm.
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seded by the 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement. 52 Political
cooperation, on the other hand, was centrally facilitated by the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),53 the principal Southeast Asian
venue for inter-ASEAN and intra-ASEAN dialogue, negotiations and
formalization of Member State commitments on regional security is-
sues. 54 Other key institutions include the ASEAN Leaders' Summit
(the highest decision-making body of pre-Charter ASEAN) and the
ASEAN Secretariat and Office of the Secretary-General, whose op-
erational mandates, in turn, were contoured along the annual agenda
set by each Leaders' Summit.55
By the time the ASEAN States started considering formal in-
tegration at the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005,56
ASEAN States had already built up a copious body of "ASEAN
Law"-separately negotiated treaties, agreements and other instru-
ments that applied to specific regulatory areas. 57 Before the entry in-
to force of the ASEAN Charter on December 15, 2008, ASEAN
States had already concluded at least 313 main treaties (not taking in-
to account implementing protocols, sectoral communiqu6s and organ-
izational declarations), which applied to different regulatory areas,
52. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.aseansec.org/
22223.pdf. For the most authoritative and comprehensive discussions of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area's operations during the pre-Charter ASEAN, see PAUL J. DAVIDSON, ASEAN:
THE EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION 51-124 (2002);
MOHAMMED ZAKIRUL HAFEZ, THE DIMENSIONS OF REGIONAL TRADE INTEGRATION IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA 125-200 (2004).
53. See Terms of Reference and Concept Papers, ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/TermsofReferencesandConceptPapers/tab
id/89/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
54. For a review of ASEAN regional security initiatives and policies in the pre-Charter
ASEAN, see Kusuma Snitwongse, Thirty Years ofASEAN.- Achievements Through Political
Cooperation, 11 PAC. REV. 183 (1998).
55. Carolina G. Hernandez, Institution-Building Through an ASEAN Charter (paper
originally presented at the 8th Europe-East Asia Thinktank Dialogue: Strengthening
Regional and Inter-Regional Cooperation in Responding to Rising Extremism and Resurging
Nationalism, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Inst. for Strategic and Development Stud. and the
European Inst. of Asian Stud.) (Oct. 29-Nov. 3, 2006), (available at http://www.kas.de/
upload/auslandshomepages/singapore/HernandezAseanCharta.pdf).
56. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, Dec. 12,
2005, http://www.aseansec.org/18030.htm; see also Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the
ASEAN Charter, Jan. 13, 2007, http://www.aseansec.org/19257.htm.
57. On the effects of 'localization' of transnational norms upon the subsequent
development of ASEAN institutions, see Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose
Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT'L
ORG., 239 (2004).
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such as human security, trade, investment, finance, commerce, mari-
time and admiralty, communications and transportation, energy, envi-
ronment, agriculture and food security, intellectual property, educa-
tion, health and cultural exchanges. 58 ASEAN Member States im-
implemented these treaties within their respective jurisdictions, based
on their own constitutional or statutory procedures. In setting and as-
sessing operational timetables, performance targets and policy con-
formity, national secretariats worked with their counterpart Southeast
Asian administrative agencies, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Office
of the Secretary-General. The ASEAN Leaders' Summit would then
annually decide and formulate its multi-sector cooperation agenda
based on these national government-led agency initiatives and rec-
ommendations. 59
ASEAN cooperation in the pre-Charter era featured more leg-
islative (law-making) and executive (law-implementing) functions,
rather than formal judicial oversight or interpretation. The ASEAN
Leaders' Summit was the official intergovernmental body of pre-
Charter ASEAN, where treaties, regulatory instruments, agreements
and protocols were signed at the most senior level by Southeast
Asian heads of state. While the Leaders' Summit could certainly
have taken up some quasi-judicial oversight functions (such as hear-
ing national government petitions or motions seeking fellow States'
compliance with ASEAN treaties, agreements and instruments), as a
matter of public practice Southeast Asian heads of state declined to
do so (or failed to achieve any consensus when urged to do so),60 fre-
quently justifying their refusal through the 1976 TAC's core princi-
ple of non-interference (non-intervention). 61 In over forty years as a
regional cooperation, ASEAN has stood by this principle of non-
interference by refraining from openly criticizing Member States'
human rights records, refusing support to any opposition movements,
insisting on consensus voting and resorting to informal (and often
58. For a list of ASEAN treaties as of September 2010 and their respective ratification
statuses, see Table of ASEAN Treaties/Agreements and Ratification, ASEAN SECRETARIAT,
available at http://www.aseansec.org/Ratification.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
59. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, The Structure of Decision-Making, in THE 2ND ASEAN
READER 30-32 (Sharon Siddique & Sree Kumar eds., 2004).
60. Robin Ramcharan, ASEAN and Non-Interference, in THE 2ND ASEAN READER,
supra note 59, at 52-57; Isabella Bennett & Julie Ginsberg, Backgrounder, ASEAN: The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18616/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
61. See Amitav Acharya, ASEAN at 40: Mid-Life Rejuvenation?, FOREIGN AFF., Aug.
15, 2007, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64249/amitav-acharya/asean-
at-40-mid-life-rejuvenation.
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privately brokered) settlement of differences at the ministerial level.62
Notwithstanding the "hybrid treaty-constitution" status of the 1967
ASEAN Bangkok Declaration and the 1976 TAC, pre-Charter
ASEAN did not exemplify full functional constitutionalization.
B. ASEAN Charter
The ASEAN Charter created both continuity and change in
the region's legal framework and processes. On the one hand, Arti-
cle 52(1) of the ASEAN Charter provides that "[a]ll treaties, conven-
tions, agreements, concords, declarations, protocols and other
ASEAN instruments which have been in effect before the entry into
force of this Charter shall continue to be valid."63 To avoid norma-
tive conflicts, Charter rights and obligations expressly prevail over
inconsistent norms in pre-Charter instruments. 64 A key ASEAN
Principle "reaffirm[s] and adhere[s] to the fundamental principles
contained in the declarations, agreements, conventions, concords,
treaties and other instruments of ASEAN." 65 Evidently pre-Charter
"ASEAN Law" would continue to bind ASEAN Member States un-
less otherwise provided in the Charter or terminated by future legisla-
tion in ASEAN's new institutions.
On the other hand, change occurred in both normative and in-
stitutional aspects. Normatively, the ASEAN Charter Purposes (Ar-
ticle 1) and Principles (Article 2) espouse pacifism, 66 liberal demo-
cratic values of representation and participation, 67 development-
oriented capitalism and trade liberalization68 and the deliberate crea-
tion of a regional political identity under ASEAN. 69 The Charter ob-
ligates ASEAN Member States to "take all necessary measures, in-
cluding the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to
effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply
62. John Funston, ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Practice and
Prospects (Inst. of Se. Asian Studies (ISEAS), Working Paper No. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/trends520.pdf.
63. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 52(1).
64. Id. art. 52(2).
65. Id. art. 2(1).
66. Id. arts. 1(1)-1(4), 2(2)(a)-2(2)(d).
67. Id. arts. 1(7), 1(11), 1(13),2(2)(f)-2(2)(i).
68. Id. arts. 1(5), 1(6), 1(9), 1(10), 2(2)(n).
69. Id. arts. 1(14)-1(15), 2(2)(1)-2(2)(m).
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with all obligations of membership." 70 Significantly included among
the broad compass of Charter provisions that ASEAN Member States
are expressly obligated to implement are "the United Nations Charter
and international law, including international humanitarian law, sub-
scribed to by ASEAN Member States"; 71 "multilateral trade rules and
ASEAN's rules-based regimes for effective implementation of eco-
nomic commitments and progressive reduction towards the elimina-
tion of all barriers to regional economic integration, in a market-
driven economy"; 72 as well as "adherence to the rule of law, good
governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional govern-
ment" 73 and "respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and
protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice." 74
Given these broadly worded terms of obligation, Southeast Asian
states appear to have expressly accepted a much wider range of inter-
national legal norms than their commitments under the pre-Charter
ASEAN. 75
ASEAN Charter institutions nominally continue much of pre-
Charter ASEAN's horizontally embedded bureaucracy, albeit with
several hierarchical changes. The pre-Charter ASEAN Leaders'
Summit was replaced by the ASEAN Summit. Like the Leaders'
Summit, the ASEAN Summit is composed of the heads of state of the
ASEAN Member States.76 Instead of the annual Leaders' Summit
meetings, the ASEAN Summit is now mandated to meet at least
semi-annually, convening special or ad hoc sessions in between each
meeting when necessary.77 In contrast to the Leaders' Summit, how-
ever, the ASEAN Summit has more expansive and consolidated poli-
cy-making, administrative, decision-making and oversight authority
to guide and direct various levels of the ASEAN bureaucracy. The
ASEAN Summit is the "supreme policy-making body of ASEAN," 78
which "deliberate[s], provide[s] policy guidance, and take[s] deci-
sions on key issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives of
70. Id. art. 5(2) (emphasis added).
71. Id. art. 2(2)() (emphasis added).
72. Id. art. 2(2)(n).
73. Id. art. 2(2)(h).
74. Id. art. 2(2)(i).
75. I have argued elsewhere that this extends to international human rights obligations.
See Desierto, supra note 8.
76. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 7(1).
77. Id. art. 7(3).
78. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
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ASEAN, important matters of interest to Member States and all is-
sues referred to it by the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN
Community Councils, and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies." 79
The ASEAN Summit possesses considerable continuing administra-
tive authority, shown by the fact that it can directly instruct ASEAN
Council Ministers "to hold ad hoc inter-Ministerial meetings, and ad-
dress important issues concerning ASEAN that cut across the Com-
munity Councils,"80 as well as "authorise the establishment and dis-
solution of Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and other ASEAN
institutions."81 However, it is doubtful if the ASEAN Summit's au-
thority to dissolve "other ASEAN institutions" could extend to Char-
ter-based institutions such as the ASEAN Coordinating Council,82 the
ASEAN Community Councils (the ASEAN Political-Security Com-
munity Council, the ASEAN Economic Community Council and the
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council),83 the Secretary-
General and Permanent Secretariat, 84 the Committee of Permanent
Representatives to ASEAN85 and the ASEAN National Secretariats, 86
among others. Interpreting this degree of administrative authority for
the ASEAN Summit would defeat the Charter's Amendments proce-
dure under Article 48, which separately requires Member States to
ratify any amendments to the Charter.
A further innovation in the ASEAN Summit is its generously
worded and undefined emergency powers. (It can "address emergen-
cy situations affecting ASEAN by taking appropriate actions.") 87
This dovetails with the Charter Purpose of effective response, "in ac-
cordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of
threats, transnational crimes and transboundary challenges." 88 Argu-
79. Id. art. 7(2)(b).
80. Id. art. 7(2)(c).
81. Id. art. 7(2)(f).
82. Id. art. 8.
83. Id. art. 9. The ASEAN Community Councils "ensure the implementation of the
relevant decisions of the ASEAN Summit," "coordinate the work of the different sectors
under its purview, and on issues which cut across the other Community Councils," and
"submit reports and recommendations to the ASEAN Summit on matters under its purview."
Id.
84. Id. art. 11.
85. Id. art. 12.
86. Id. art. 13.
87. Id. art. 7(2)(d) (emphasis added).
88. Id. art. 1(8).
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ably, this untested residual authority exists in addition to the plenary
rule-making powers of the ASEAN Summit.
Apart from its assumption of executive and legislative func-
tions, however, the ASEAN Summit appears to have also been vested
with a form of quasi-judicial oversight. The Charter empowers the
ASEAN Summit to "decide on matters referred to it under Chapters
VII (Decision-Making) and VIII (Settlement of Disputes)." 89 The
Leaders' Summit in pre-Charter ASEAN observed a strict consensus
rule in decision-making. While the ASEAN Charter maintains the
consultation and consensus rule (musyawarah-mufakat), it does per-
mit the ASEAN Summit flexibility to devise alternative forms of de-
cision-making when consensus cannot be achieved. 90 This provision
was included in the Charter after taking into consideration the rec-
ommendation of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), a body created
by pre-Charter ASEAN to draw up guidelines for drafting the Char-
ter.91 In providing for the ASEAN Summit's decision-making au-
thority, the Charter text does not differentiate between factual and le-
gal determinations. While the Charter provides for dispute settle-
settlement as provided in specific ASEAN instruments such as the
ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism and
the 1976 TAC, 92 the ASEAN Summit also has explicit authority to
decide disputes that remain unresolved notwithstanding the applica-
tion of other dispute settlement procedures within the Charter frame-
work: "When a dispute remains unresolved, after the application of
the preceding provisions of this Chapter, this dispute shall be referred
to the ASEAN Summit, for its decision." 93 A Member State's non-
compliance with findings, decisions or recommendations resulting
from any ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism is likewise referable
to the ASEAN Summit for decision.94 The Charter does not provide
any recourse from an ASEAN Summit decision, although it does pre-
authorize the future establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism
for disputes "which concern the interpretation or application of this
89. Id. art. 7(2)(e).
90. Id. art. 20(2) ("Where consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit may
decide how a specific decision can be made.").
91. Rosario Gonzalez-Manalo, Drafting ASEAN's Tomorrow: The Eminent Persons
Group and the ASEAN Charter, in THE MAKING OF THE ASEAN CHARTER, supra note 21, at
42.
92. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, arts. 22-24.
93. Id. art. 26.
94. Id. art. 27(2).
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Charter and other ASEAN instruments." 95  On April 8, 2010 (or
about two years after the passage of the Charter), ASEAN Member
States signed the Protocol on this new dispute settlement mecha-
nism.96
Many of the Charter institutions were built on the existing
administrative linkages of ASEAN as a regional cooperation. The
key difference between these institutions and their pre-Charter prede-
cessors is a matter of mandate. At the most localized level of the
ASEAN bureaucracy, the ASEAN National Secretariats crucially
"serve as the national focal point" and the "repository of information
on all ASEAN matters at the national level." 97 The National Secre-
tariats continue their pre-Charter functions of coordinating the im-
plementation of ASEAN decisions in their respective Southeast
Asian jurisdictions, 98 while retaining a limited ability to influence the
ASEAN Summit's agenda by "coordinat[ing] and support[ing] the
national preparations of ASEAN meetings," 99 as previous National
Secretariats had done when ASEAN was a regional cooperation.
Other Charter institutions that have also continued their functions
from pre-Charter ASEAN include the ASEAN Communities, the
ASEAN Office of the Secretary-General and the ASEAN Permanent
Secretariat. The Charter formally vests each ASEAN Community
Council (whether Political-Security, Economic or Socio-Cultural)
with the authority to "ensure the implementation of the relevant deci-
sions of the ASEAN Summit," coordinate internally with its opera-
tional sectors and externally with other Community Councils, as well
as submit reports and recommendations to the ASEAN Summit for
its consideration and decision.100 The ASEAN Secretary-General
now discharges de jure (with a broader administrative complement
and operational budget),101 its former pre-Charter functions as de fac-
95. Id. art. 25.
96. Ubaidillah Mash, ASEAN Pact To Resolve Conflicts, BRUNEI NEWS, Apr. 9, 2010,
available at http://news.brunei.fin/2010/04/09/asean-pact-to-resolve-conflicts/. For a brief
discussion of the implications of this Protocol in relation to the problem of judicial
oversight, see infra Part II.
97. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 13(a)-(b); see also Strong ASEAN Community
up to Members, Says PM, VIET NAM NEWS, Apr. 8, 2010, http://vietnamnews.vnagency.
com.vn/Politics-Laws/198480/Strong-ASEAN-community-up-to-members-says-PM-.html.
98. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 13(c).
99. Id. art. 13(d).
100. Id. art. 9(4).
101. Compare id. art. 11(4)-11(8), with id. art. 30.
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to Chief Administrative Officer, 102 although he or she now has a
fixed and non-renewable five-year term under the Charter. 103
The ASEAN Charter also created new institutions as part of
the framework to implement all future ASEAN Summit decisions
and to ensure compliance with the existing corpus of ASEAN Law.
It formally designated ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, 104 which
took over from the inter-ministry or inter-department linkages be-
tween Southeast Asian governments during pre-Charter ASEAN, as
well as an ASEAN Coordinating Council as an institutional liaison
between the ASEAN Community Councils.105 Consistent with
ASEAN's formal organizational status, the Charter established a
Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN that vested each
Representative with the rank of Ambassador. 106 Finally, in perhaps
the most controversial (or oft-critiqued) institution of the Charter, an
102. Compare id. art. 11(3), with id. art. 11(2). Article 11(2) states:
2. The Secretary-General shall:
(a) carry out the duties and responsibilities of this high office in
accordance with the provisions of this Charter and relevant ASEAN
instruments, protocols, and established practices;
(b) facilitate and monitor progress in the implementation of ASEAN
agreements and decisions, and submit an annual report on the work
of ASEAN to the ASEAN Summit;
(c) participate in meetings of the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN
Community Councils, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, and
ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and other relevant ASEAN
meetings;
(d) present the views of ASEAN and participate in meetings with
external parties in accordance with approved policy guidelines and
mandate given to the Secretary-General; and
(e) recommend the appointment and termination of the Deputy
Secretaries-General to the ASEAN Coordinating Council for
approval.
Id.
103. Id. art. 11(1).
104. Article 10(1) of the Charter states:
1. ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies shall:
(a) function in accordance with their respective mandates;
(b) implement the agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit
under their respective purview;
(c) strengthen cooperation in their respective fields in support of
ASEAN integration and community-building; and
(d) submit reports and recommendations to their respective Community
Councils.
Id. art. 10(1).
105. Id. art. 8(2).
106. Id. art. 12.
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ASEAN Human Rights Body was pre-authorized, whose "terms of
reference [are] to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers
Meeting." 107 About two years after the passage of the Charter,
ASEAN Foreign Ministers approved and issued the Terms of Refer-
ence for the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights (AICHR).108 As I discuss in Part II, in relation to the problem
of judicial oversight, the AICHR presents a clear example of a dis-
junctive space between the Charter's normative aspirations towards
thick constitutionalism and the actual choices made by ASEAN's au-
thoritative decision-makers.
Finally, a significant structural change in the new Charter-
based ASEAN is its potentially sweeping organizational inclusive-
ness. It enumerates ASEAN membership as currently composed of
all of Southeast Asia's states (Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of
Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Phil-
ippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam), 109 but also provides for procedures
for admission of new members, despite the fact that there do not ap-
pear to be any other geographically defined Southeast Asian states
left out of ASEAN. 110 The Charter encourages entities (State and
non-state) to officially associate with ASEAN, 1  accredits Ambassa-
dors from non-ASEAN States and intergovernmental organiza-
tions,1 12 and allows the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to confer
to non-ASEAN States the formal status of Dialogue Partner, Sectoral
Dialogue Partner, Development Partner, Special Observer, Guest or
any other status.113 To date, ASEAN has extensive economic and po-
litical security partnerships with the "ASEAN Plus 3" (China, Japan
and Korea), 114 the United States,115 Europe, 116 Australia,117 Cana-
107. Id. art. 14(2).
108. See Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/DOC-TOR-AHRB.pdf (last visited
Feb. 21, 2011).
109. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 4.
110. Id. art. 6.
111. Id. art. 16.
112. Id. art. 46.
113. Id. arts. 44(1)-(2).
114. For the historical overview of the ASEAN +3 partnership, see ASEAN Plus Three
Cooperation, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2011).
2011] 293
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
da, 118 China, 119 India,120 Japan, 121 Russia,122 the Republic of Korea1 23
and New Zealand, 124 among others. Significantly, in 2009, the Unit-
115. See Joint Vision Statement on ASEAN-United States of America Enhanced
Partnership (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.aseansec.org/17871.htm; ASEAN-
United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International
Terrorism, (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.aseansec.org/7424.htm; Memorandum
of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the ASEAN Secretariat
Concerning Cooperation on Trade-Related Standards and Conformance Issues (Apr. 5,
2001), available at http://www.aseansec.org/5979.htm.
116. For the historical overview of the ASEAN-Europe partnership, see Overview of
ASEAN-EUDialogue Relations, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/23216.htm.
See also Nuremberg Declaration on an Enhanced EU-ASEAN Partnership (Mar. 15, 2007),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/20693.pdf; Plan of Action to Implement the
Nuremberg Declaration on an Enhanced EU-ASEAN Partnership, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/21122.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between the European
Community and ASEAN Concerning Cooperation on Standards and Conformance (Oct. 1,
1999), available at http://www.aseansec.org/5671.htm; Financing Memorandum Between
the European Community and Government of Brunei Darussalam (Jan. 21, 1994), available
at http://www.aseansec.org/5658.htm; Cooperation Agreement Between the Member
Countries of ASEAN and the European Community (Mar. 7, 1980), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/1501.htm.
117. See Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area
(Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.aseansec.org/22260.pdf; Framework for the AFTA-
CER Closer Economic Partnership (2007), available at http://www.aseansec.org/
14005.htm; Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Australia
Comprehensive Partnership (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.aseansec.org/
21373.htm; Ministerial Declaration on the AFTA-CER Closer Economic Partnership (Sept.
14, 2002), available at http://www.aseansec.org/12780.htm.
118. For the historical overview of the ASEAN-Canada partnership, see ASEAN-
Canada Dialogue (Aug., 2010), available at http://www.aseansec.org/5590.htm. See also
ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (July
28, 2006), available at http://www.aseansec.org/l8596.htm.
119. For the historical overview of the ASEAN-China partnership (separate and
independent from the ASEAN +3), see ASEAN-People's Republic of China, ASEAN
SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/20185.htm. See Memorandum of Understanding
between ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Strengthening
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Cooperation (Nov. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/21089.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding between the ASEAN
Secretariat and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China on
Agricultural Cooperation (Jan. 14, 2007), available at http://www.aseansec.org/19286.htm;
Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China (Nov. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm; Agreement on Dispute Settlement
Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China (Nov. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/16635.htm; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China (Nov. 4, 2002), available
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ed States signed the Instrument of Accession to the ASEAN's 1976
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. 125
C. Functional Constitutionalization and the ASEAN
Bureaucracy
Having entered into force in 2008, the ASEAN Charter re-
mains in the nascent stages of implementation. The 2010 ASEAN
Summit chaired by Vietnam focused on the continued implementa-
tion of the ASEAN Charter and the Roadmap for an ASEAN Com-
munity, specifically addressing issues of economic recovery and de-
velopment, intra-ASEAN connectivity, climate change, education
and human resource development. 126 The ASEAN Summit noted the
establishment of new ASEAN institutions such as the ASEAN Coor-
dinating Council, the Community Councils, the Committee of Per-
manent Representatives to ASEAN and the ASEAN Intergovernmen-
at http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm; Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on
Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues (Nov. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/13185.htm.
120. See ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress, and Shared Prosperity (Nov. 30,
2004), available at http://www.aseansec.org/16839.htm; Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Republic of India and ASEAN (Oct. 8,
2003), available at http://www.aseansec.org/15278.htm; ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for
Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.
aseansec.org/l 5276.htm.
121. For the historical overview of the ASEAN-Japan partnership and major agreements
on the free trade area, ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/
4973.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
122. For the historical overview of the ASEAN-Russia partnership and major
agreements, see ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.
aseansec.org/5922.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2011); Russia Federation, ASEAN
SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/4981.htm (last visited Feb, 21, 2011).
123. For a list of relevant documents, see ASEAN-ROK, ASEAN SECRETARIAT,
http://www.aseansec.org/4980.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
124. For the historical overview of the ASEAN-New Zealand partnership and major
agreements on the free trade area, see ASEAN-New Zealand, ASEAN SECRETARIAT,
http://www.aseansec.org/4976.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
125. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, United States Accedes to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126294.htm.
126. See ASEAN Chairman, Chairman's Statement of the 16th ASEAN Summit:
Towards the ASEAN Community: From Vision to Action (Apr. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/24509.htm.
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tal Commission on Human Rights, but also admitted the incomplete
status of ASEAN's implementing legal framework. The heads of
state at the ASEAN Summit signed the Protocol to the ASEAN Char-
ter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and the Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of ASEAN, but they have not concluded
or ratified remaining Community agreements that would expedite
ASEAN integration. 127 During the same 2010 Summit, however, the
current ASEAN leadership did not take categorical action beyond
muted public pronouncements on urgent issues, such as the Myanmar
junta's exclusion of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from up-
coming elections, 128 political tensions at Bangkok between the Thai
government and the Thaksin Shinawatra-led opposition1 29 and the re-
cent massacre of journalists and civilians in the southern Philip-
pines. 130 While the ASEAN Summit's reticence to adopt direct ac-
tion could be seen as a remnant of the pre-Charter emphasis on non-
interference, it is also more likely that the ASEAN Summit suffers
from institutional inertia in negotiating the transition to a Charter-
based system. As an example, the first meeting of the ASEAN Inter-
governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2010 ex-
hibited implementation difficulties arising from ambiguities on its in-
stitutional mandate, rules of procedure and operational guidelines. 131
From a constitutionalization standpoint, the Charter-based
ASEAN established functional competencies within the ASEAN bu-
reaucracy 32 but not without attendant complications. As previously
discussed, the Charter's design for the ASEAN Summit, as ASEAN's
highest decision-making body, combines ultimate legislative and ex-
ecutive powers in the organization with (some) quasi-judicial authori-
127. Id. TT 12-37.
128. See John Rutwich, ASEAN Urges Myanmar To Hold Fair Election, REUTERS, Apr.
9, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSGE63803N20100409?type-marketsNews.
129. See ASEAN Secretary-General, Statement by the Secretary-General on the
Situation in Thailand (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.aseansec.org/24541.htm.
130. Nikko Dizon, No Justice from ASEAN for Massacre Victims, PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER, Apr. 1, 2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100
401-261888/No-justice-from-ASEAN-for-massacre-victims.
131. See ASEAN Convenes on Human Rights in Indonesia, XINHUA NEWS, Apr. 2, 2010,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-04/01/c_13234165.htm; Ismira Lutfia &
Markus Junianto Sihaloho, ASEAN Human Rights Body Rebuffs Victims Activists, JAKARTA
GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/national/asean-human-rights-body-
rebuffs-victims-activists/366568.
132. On the constitutionalist theory of formal international organizations, see Geir
Ulfstein, Institutions and Competences, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 18, 45-80.
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ty in dispute settlement between ASEAN Members. While numerous
ASEAN subsidiary bodies such as the Community Councils and oth-
er Charter organs play important roles in the ASEAN legislative and
executive processes, the Charter makes it clear that ultimate authority
is vested in the decision-making authority of the heads of state that
comprise the ASEAN Summit. Constitutional controls, at least as
understood in contemporary domestic constitutional systems' theo-
ries of separation of powers and checks and balances, 133 are markedly
lacking in the Charter-based ASEAN. As I show in Part II, this gap
is a frequent undercurrent in the structural challenges that confront
ASEAN's attempt at constitutionalization.
III. STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES TO ASEAN's
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Considering the Charter-based ASEAN's model of "horizon-
tal embeddedness" (where pre-existing ASEAN cooperative net-
works were transposed into a formal international organization) in
which the ASEAN Summit acts as the executive, legislative and qua-
si-judicial epicenter, how do we visualize ASEAN's implementation
of the fundamental Charter Principle of "upholding the United Na-
tions Charter and international law, including international humani-
tarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States"? 134 This key
ASEAN Charter Principle obligates ASEAN as an international or-
ganization to ensure that the Member States comply with, and abide
by, the fundamental norms of general international law. Implement-
ing this ASEAN Charter Principle thus requires scrutiny into how
ASEAN Member States indeed achieve international legal compli-
ance through their executive branches' and national courts' respec-
tive implementation and recognition of international legal norms.
As the ASEAN Summit and the rest of the ASEAN bureau-
cracy acts to further implement the Charter and the increasing body
of ASEAN Law, I submit that there are three key systemic issues
arising from ASEAN's structural design that will have an immediate
and long-term impact on ASEAN policy-making. While it may in-
133. Professor Ackerman's model of "constrained parliamentarism" through the
intermediation of other checking institutions might be the most useful and applicable
paradigm for reconceptualizing the diffuse bureaucratic structure of a Charter-based
ASEAN. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633,
633-729 (2000).
134. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 2(2)().
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deed be the case that the political culture of ASEAN leadership caus-
es selective enforcement of international law, 135 pending actual em-
pirical measurement this claim of international (non) compliance will
remain strongly disputed. For this reason, I invite scrutiny instead to
structural issues that could qualitatively affect the legality of ASEAN
Summit decisions, ASEAN Law and international law among the
ASEAN Member States: the problem of incorporation (lack of direct
effect), the problem of hybridity and normative transplantation and
the problem of diffuse or insufficient judicial oversight.
The three foregoing problems are all interspersed in the issue
of Charter-based legality. Incorporation involves the layering in of
ASEAN and international obligations within Southeast Asian legal
systemS 136 and calls into question the binding nature and scope of
these obligations within each ASEAN Member State. National
courts' hybrid interpretations of ASEAN norms provoke methodo-
logical issues of context within the unitary system of interpretation of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 137 and par-
ticularly, the leeway that ASEAN Member States possess in inter-
preting the Charter, ASEAN Summit decisions, ASEAN Law and
(incorporated) international law from the lens of their respective do-
mestic courts as well as from the comparative jurisprudence of other
Southeast Asian courts. 138 Finally, judicial oversight is crucial for
135. Dr. Lee Jones has incisively proposed that ASEAN states have intervened in the
affairs of other Southeast Asian states, but that the principle of non-interference ultimately
served as a subterfuge for Southeast Asian elites' attempts to maintain a non-communist
social order. See Lee Jones, ASEAN and the Norm ofNon-Interference in Southeast Asia: A
Quest for Social Order, (Nuffield College Politics Working Group Paper, 2009), available at
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/politics/papers/2009/Jones.March2009.pdf.
136. On the role of domestic legal systems in the implementation of international law,
see BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL
SYSTEMS 8-12, 34-40, 108-114 (1993).
137. See ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 101-32 (2007).
138. For an example of domestic jurisprudence on treaties, see I.M. Sinclair, The
Principles of Treaty Interpretation and their Application by English Courts, 12 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 508 (1963). For an example of the reference to comparative jurisprudence in the
interpretation of international law, see ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION
OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 301-93, 487-96 (2008). Finally, Karen
Knop, Ralf Michaels and Annelise Riles argue a "conflict of laws" paradigm for
international law as applied by domestic courts. See Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels, &
Annelise Riles, International Law in Domestic Courts: A Conflict of Laws Approach
(Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-016, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1413189 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
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both institutional accountability and legal consistency in ASEAN. 139
Judicial oversight, even if administered primarily by national courts
(and possibly subsidiarily by the ASEAN Summit), creates the possi-
bility of review, remedy and recourse available to Member States' in-
ternal constituencies against ASEAN actions. In theory, the collec-
tive oversight functions discharged by national courts and the
ASEAN Summit should advance the implementation of "ASEAN
Law" and international law across Southeast Asia through harmoni-
zation and legal predictability. In practice, however, absent regular
and institutionalized judicial cooperation (or more ideally, "court-to-
court communications"1 40) among Southeast Asian courts, there will
likely be a continuing cacophony of varying judicial interpretations
and disparate national implementation of "ASEAN Law" and interna-
tional law.
A. The Problem ofIncorporation or Lack ofDirect Effect
The ASEAN Charter appears silent on the possibility of the
direct effect of the Charter or ASEAN Summit decisions within
Member States. Rather, Article 5(2) of the Charter obligates Member
States to "take all necessary measures, including the enactment of
appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provi-
sions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of member-
ship."1 41 While ASEAN Summit decisions are binding on the mem-
bership, the Charter does not provide precise terms for the
implementation of these decisions by the Member States. 142 While
Article 5(2) of the Charter indicates enactment of domestic legisla-
tion as one way of giving effect to Charter provisions or membership
obligations, it is only one example of the "necessary measures" that a
Member State could pursue. Depending on the constitutional or stat-
utory mechanisms within each Member State, Charter provisions,
membership obligations, ASEAN Summit decisions and international
law could therefore be self-executing or non-self-executing.
139. On the problems that can arise from wrongful application of the judicial function in
international law, see HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 85-138 (The Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1993).
140. See a paradigmatic example of this contemporary litigation practice in the
Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (May 16, 2000), http://www.ali.org/doc/Guidelines.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010).
141. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 5(2) (emphasis added).
142. Id. arts. 7(2), 20(l)-(4).
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A brief perusal of the written constitutions of the ten South-
east Asian states reveals that while international law occupies the
normative rank of either statutory legislation or constitutional
norms, 143 there are few jurisdictions (such as the Philippines and
Thailand) that arguably contain some constitutional space for self-
executing treaties. 144 While the majority of these constitutions ap-
pear to require legislative enactment to give effect to treaties (such as
Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and for certain categories
of treaties in the Philippines and Thailand), others are silent on the
matter altogether (such as Brunei, Singapore and Laos). The Malay-
sian Federal Parliament is vested by the Malaysian Constitution with
the power to make laws "for the purpose of implementing any treaty,
agreement or convention between the Federation and any other coun-
try, or any decision of an international organisation of which the Fed-
eration is a member."1 45 Indonesia's President possesses constitu-
tional authority to "conclude treaties with other countries" with the
approval of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative
Council) or subject to statutory regulation. 146 Vietnam's Constitution
fully empowers its legislative branch, through the National Assem-
bly, to "decide fundamental policies in external relations; to ratify or
annul international agreements that have been signed or entered upon
the proposal of the President." 147 Myanmar's 2008 Constitution also
distinguishes between treaties and agreements that require approval
of its legislative branch through the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, and those
that do not require such approval. 148 Brunei Darussalam's 1984 Con-
143. For a comprehensive survey of incorporation mechanisms across constitutions
around the world, see LAMBERTUS ERADES, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND
MUNICIPAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE CASE LAW STUDY (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Cees
Flinterman eds., 1993). See also CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASEAN
COUNTRIES (Carmelo V. Sison ed., 1990).
144. For a global survey of individual national courts' jurisprudence on implementation
of treaties (whether by direct application or requiring further legislative transformation), see
ERADES, supra note 143, at 886-944.
145. PERLEMBAGAAN MALAYSIA [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 31, 1957, sec. 76(l)(a).
146. UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 18, 1945,
arts. 1 l(l)- 11(3) (amended 2002).
147. HIN PHAP CONG HOA XA HOI CHO NGHIA VIAT NAM [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 15, 1992,
art. 84(13) (Vietnam).
148. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 10, 2008, sec.
209. Section 209 of the Constitution states that:
209. The President, in accord with the law:
(a) shall enter into, ratify or annul international, regional or bilateral
treaties which require the approval of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, or
revoke from such treaties;
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stitution does not clearly indicate whether treaties are self-executing
or non-self-executing, although the Constitution prohibits the intro-
duction (without prior consent of Brunei's monarch) of legislative
bills "which shall appear inconsistent with obligations imposed upon
His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan or Her Majesty by Trea-
ty or Agreement." 149 A similar ambiguity appears from the text of
Singapore's 1965 Constitution (as amended in 2008), which is silent
on the effect of treaties and international obligations, employing lan-
guage instead that refers to the capacity of the State to enter into such
treaties and obligations. 150 Laos' President has the power to "declare
on the ratification or abolition of all treaties and agreements signed
with foreign countries," 151 but the Laos Constitution does not indicate
whether legislative approval is necessary before such treaties and
agreements could be given effect. Thailand's 2007 Constitution
(b) may enter into, ratify or annul international, regional or bilateral
treaties which do not require the approval of the Pyidaungsu
HIluttaw, or revoke from such treaties.
Id.
149. PERLEMBAGAAN NEGERI BRUNEI [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 29, 1959, art. 42.1(b)
(amended 1984).
150. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Aug. 9, 1965, pt. III, cl. 7 (amended
1963). According to article III clause 7:
Participation in co-operative international schemes which are beneficial to
Singapore
7. Without in any way derogating from the force and effect of Article 6,
nothing in that Article shall be construed as precluding Singapore or any
association, body or organisation therein from-
(a) participating or co-operating in, or contributing towards, any
scheme, venture, project, enterprise or undertaking of whatsoever
nature, in conjunction or in concert with any other sovereign state
or with any Federation, Confederation, country or countries or any
association, body or organisation therein, where such scheme,
venture, project, enterprise or undertaking confers, has the effect of
conferring or is intended to confer, on Singapore or any association,
body or organisation therein, any economic, financial, industrial,
social, cultural, educational or other benefit of any kind or is, or
appears to be, advantageous in any way to Singapore or any
association, body or organisation therein; or
(b) entering into any treaty, agreement, contract, pact or other
arrangement with any other sovereign state or with any Federation,
Confederation, country or countries or any association, body or
organisation therein, where such treaty, agreement, contract, pact or
arrangement provides for mutual or collective security or any other
object or purpose whatsoever which is, or appears to be, beneficial
or advantageous to Singapore in any way.
Id.
151. CONSTITUTION OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC Aug. 14, 1991, art.
53(11).
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might appear to distinguish between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties. The Thai Constitution obligates the State to
"promote friendly relations with other countries and adopt the princi-
ple of non-discrimination and ... comply with human rights conven-
tions in which Thailand is a party thereto as well as international ob-
ligations concluded with other countries and international organiza-
organizations,"1 52 but it does not provide for categorical language on
the direct effect of such conventions and international obligations.
Nevertheless the Thai Constitution contains language that specifical-
ly distinguishes a limited set of treaties that would expressly require
approval of the National Assembly, from the Thai monarch's general
constitutional authority to conclude treaties. 153
The 1987 Philippine Constitution stands alone among South-
east Asian constitutions for expressly "adopt[ing] the generally ac-
152. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND Aug. 19, 2007, pt. 6, sec. 82, para. 1.
153. According to sec. 190 of the CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND:
The King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice and other
treaties with other countries or international organizations.
A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories or the Thai
external territories that Thailand has sovereign right or jurisdiction over such
territories under any treaty or an international law or requires the enactment of
an Act for its implementation or affects immensely to economic or social
security of the country or results in the binding of trade, investment budget of
the country significantly must be approved by the National Assembly. In such
case, the National Assembly must complete its consideration within sixty days
as from the date of receipt of such matter.
Before the conclusion of a treaty with other countries or international
organizations under paragraph two, the Council of Ministers must provide
information thereon to the public, conduct public consultation and state
information in relevant thereto to the National Assembly. In such case, the
Council of Ministers must submit negotiation framework to the National
Assembly for approval.
Upon giving signature to the treaty under paragraph two, the Council of
Ministers shall, prior to give consent to be bound, facilitate the public to get
access to the details of such treaty. In the case where the application of such
treaty has affected the public or small and medium entrepreneurs, the Council
of Ministers must revise or render remedy to such effects rapidly, expediently
and fairly.
There shall be a law determining measure and procedure for the conclusion
of a treaty having immense effects to economic or social security of the country
or resulting in the binding of trade or investment of the country significantly
and the revision or rendering of remedy to the effects of such treaty with due
regard to the fairness among the beneficiaries, the affected persons and the
general public.
A matter arising from the provisions of paragraph two falls within the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and the provisions of section 154 (1)
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the referring of the matter to the Constitutional
Court.
Id. § 190.
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cepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooper-
ation, and amity with all nations,"1 54 a constitutional provision that
the Philippine Supreme Court has repeatedly used as the basis for de-
claring that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (by nature a
non-binding international instrument) has full legal and binding ef-
fect in the Philippines. 155 Despite this liberality, however, the 1987
Philippine Constitution also carves out a legislative role in treaty rati-
fication, which, based on recent judicial interpretations, appears to
reserve constitutional space for self-executing as opposed to non-self-
executing treaties and international agreements. 156 Finally, among
the ten Southeast Asian states, only Cambodia's 1993 Constitution
(as amended in 1999) directly refers to international treaties and hu-
man rights law instruments: "The Kingdom of Cambodia shall rec-
ognize and respect human rights as stipulated in the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the covenants
and conventions related to human rights, women's and children's
rights." 157
Considering the lack of unanimity among ASEAN Member
States as to the effect of international obligations and norms (such as
the ASEAN Charter provisions, ASEAN Summit decisions, and in-
ternational treaties and conventions which ASEAN Member States
are mandated to uphold under Article 2(2)(j) of the ASEAN Charter)
within their respective jurisdictions, the binding effect and obligatory
scope of Charter norms and Charter-authorized norms (such as
ASEAN Summit decisions) are put into serious question. Can
ASEAN Member States invoke domestic constitutional procedures to
suspend or delay compliance with ASEAN Summit decisions, the
continuously-growing body of ASEAN Law, and international law
norms embraced under the ASEAN Charter? While the VCLT clear-
ly states that internal law cannot be invoked as a justification for fail-
ure to perform treaty obligations (subject, of course, to content and
154. SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 2, 1987, art. II, sec. 2 (Phil.).
155. Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Felixberto T.
01alia Jr., G.R. No. 153675 (S.C., Apr. 19, 2007) (en banc) (Phil.); Republic of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768 (S.C., July 21, 2003) (en banc) (Phil.); Boris
Mejoff v. The Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-2855 (S.C., July 30, 1949) (en banc) (Phil.);
Victor Borovsky v. The Commissioner of Immigration et al., G.R. No. L-2852 (S.C., June
30, 1949) (en banc) (Phil.).
156. SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 2, 1987, art. VII, sec. 21
(Phil.). See Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919 (S.C., Feb. 14, 2007); Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary., G.R. No. 158088 (S.C., July 6, 2005).
157. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA Sept. 21, 1993, art. 31, para. 1.
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good faith rules under VCLT Article 46),158 the ambiguity of
ASEAN Member States' Charter Article 5(2) duty to "take all neces-
sary measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic leg-
islation" to comply with ASEAN obligations 159 creates an interpre-
tive space for ASEAN Member States to argue their respective inter-
internal or constitutional laws in order to justify suspending, delaying
or declining to comply with ASEAN Summit decisions, ASEAN Law
and international law norms subsumed in the ASEAN Charter.
The signing of the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms on April 8, 2010 appears promising in that
ASEAN foreign ministers clearly have begun to consider the problem
of incorporation or lack of direct effect. It may be recalled that Arti-
cle 25 of the ASEAN Charter called for the establishment of "appro-
priate dispute settlement mechanisms, including arbitration," for dis-
putes "which concern the interpretation or application of this Charter
and other ASEAN instruments." 160 Following the 2010 ASEAN
Summit meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, the ASEAN Chair reported that
ASEAN Foreign Ministers:
reaffirmed the commitment to finalise the three other
instruments, namely (i) the rules for references to the
ASEAN Summit, (ii) the procedures for authorisation
under internal law and domestic law, and (iii) the rules
of procedure for requesting the ASEAN Secretariat to
interpret the ASEAN Charter, of which the first one
shall become an integral part of the Protocol. 161
While the Protocol is still pending ratification by the ASEAN
Member States, it should be pointed out that the Protocol promisingly
provides for a full range of dispute settlement procedures, including
consultation, good offices, mediation and conciliation, and arbitra-
tion. 162 If and when the Protocol enters into force and ASEAN
Member States avail themselves of its procedures, it is possible then
158. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 27, 46, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
159. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, art. 5(2).
160. Id. art. 25.
161. ASEAN Chair, Statement of the ASEAN Chair on the Signing of the Protocol to
the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN
(Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.aseansec.org/24506.htm.
162. Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Apr. 8, 2010,
available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2010/2010-protocol-to-the-asean-charter-on-dispute-
settlement-mechanisms.
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that guidance may be provided on the problem of incorporation or
lack of direct effect. Certainly, resolving this problem strikes at the
core of the authoritative and binding interpretation of Charter obliga-
tions in relation to ASEAN Member States' internal constitutional
procedures.
B. The Problem ofHybrid Interpretation
In the forty years of cooperative existence of pre-Charter
ASEAN, hybridity and normative transplantations within ASEAN in-
struments were arguably non-issues in treaty interpretation. Before
the ASEAN Charter, courts in Southeast Asia separately undertook to
interpret ASEAN instruments, conventions and all other agreements
according to their respective legal systems' jurisprudence and legal
methods. 163 There was little necessity for an ASEAN Member
State's court to look to the comparative jurisprudence of its counter-
part courts, since pre-Charter ASEAN was a loose cooperation that
did not require normative harmonization among ASEAN states.
However, today's Charter-based ASEAN can no longer afford
oblivious Southeast Asian judiciaries. Because Article 5(2) of the
Charter requires Member States to "take all necessary measures ...
to effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply
with all obligations of membership," vesting national governments
with the central role in the implementation of ASEAN Summit deci-
sions, ASEAN Law and international law embraced within the
ASEAN Charter, inevitably, national courts have to significantly par-
ticipate in the project of constitutionalization of international law in
ASEAN. 164 National courts will thus play key roles in the enforce-
ment process, particularly in the assessment of national governments'
163. See Adolf Huala, Improving the Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards
in ASEAN Countries (paper presented at the ASEAN Law Association 10th General
Assembly) (providing an example of the diverse attitudes of Southeast Asian national courts
in the enforcement of arbitral awards), available at http://www.aseanlawassociation.
org/1OGAdocs/Indonesia6.pdf. Southeast Asian states, prior to the ASEAN Charter, also
undertook their own independently customized procedures to comply with targets and
schedules under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. See Seiji Naya and Pearl Imada,
Implementing AFTA: 1992-2007, in THE ASEAN READER 513-15 (Kernial Singh Sandhu
ed., 1992).
164. See Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic
Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law: A Rejoinder to Nikolaos Lavranos,
Jacob Katz Cogan, and Tom Ginsburg, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1027, 1027-30 (2009) (detailing
the increasing importance of inter-judicial coordination and dialogue in the enforcement of
international law by domestic courts).
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compliance with ASEAN Summit decisions, ASEAN law and inter-
national law embraced within the ASEAN Charter. For this reason,
national courts must be conscious of their institutional interrelated-
ness as gatekeepers of the ASEAN Charter framework and, when ap-
propriate, consider comparative jurisprudential methodology when
adjudicating cases involving ASEAN law, decisions and norms. 165
Such an approach is not novel, since it merely situates ASEAN
norms within the unitary system of treaty interpretation under Article
31 of the VCLT. When interpreting ASEAN law, decisions and
norms as primarily contained in international treaties and other in-
struments, national courts could thus consider treaty texts and con-
texts, the subsequent and contemporaneous practices of ASEAN
states, as well as the relevant principles of international law. 166
A national court's interpretation of ASEAN law, without due
regard for the comparative jurisprudence of other Southeast Asian
courts or the regional processes of ASEAN law-making, could jeop-
ardize the future of a Charter-based ASEAN, through creeping ero-
sions on the supposedly binding effect of ASEAN law or the compe-
tences of Charter-based institutions. To illustrate the extent to which
hybrid judicial interpretations can undermine legality within ASEAN,
let us consider the issue of judicial supervision in the enforcement of
arbitral awards involving the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement (ACIA). Signed by ASEAN States on February 26, 2009,
as of this writing the ACIA has not yet entered into force due to rati-
fication delays from ASEAN Member States concerned about finaliz-
ing their own reservation lists of protected investments. 167 ASEAN
165. The proposal for a comparative jurisprudential methodology for national courts
applying international law has had its share of advocates within this decade's scholarly
literature. See, e.g., SHAHEED FATIMA, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS,
paras. 11.1-11.12 (2005); Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and
Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 103, 124-29 (2002); Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses
of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 251-52
(2008); Francesco Francioni, International Law as a Common Language for National
Courts, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 587, 590-96 (2001); International Law in National Courts, (James
Crawford and Margaret Young eds., July 11-12, 2008) (group discussion paper presented at
the 25th Anniversary Conference of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law), available
at http://www.1cil.cam.ac.uk/25th-anniversary/book.php.
166. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 158, art. 31(1)-(3).
167. See Bernie Cahiles-Magkilat, Constraints Leave RP Behind in ASEAN Investment
Scheme Integrated, THE MANILA BULLETIN, Aug. 22, 2010, http://www.mb.com.ph/
articles/273687/constraints-leave-rp-behind-asean-investment-schemeintegrated; Petchanet
Prachuangkrai, ASEAN Investment Liberalization Could Be Delayed by the Desire to Protect
Many Sectors, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/
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economic ministers at the 2010 ASEAN ministerial meeting "agreed
to progress work to facilitate greater ASEAN investment flows
through joint investment promotions, advancing work on best prac-
tices on investment and engaging the private sector in further consul-
tations to obtain feedback on improving the ASEAN investment cli-
mate."1 68 According to the ASEAN Fact Sheet on the ACIA, the
ACIA is:
the result of a consolidation and revision of two
ASEAN Investment Agreements: the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of In-
vestments (known as the Investment Guarantee
Agreement or ASEAN IGA), and the 1998 Frame-
work Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area
(commonly known as the AIA Agreement), as well as
its related Protocols. 169
The 1987 ASEAN IGA will terminate as soon as the ACIA enters in-
to force. 170
The ACIA's stated objective is "to create a free and open in-
vestment regime in ASEAN in order to achieve the end goal of eco-
nomic integration" through "progressive liberalization of the invest-
ment regimes of Member States," "provision of enhanced protection
to investors of all Member States and their investments," "improve-
ment of transparency and predictability of investment rules, regula-
tions and procedures conducive to increased investment among
Member States," "joint promotion of the region as an integrated in-
vestment area" and "cooperation to create favourable conditions for
investment by investors of a Member State in the territory of other
Member States." 171 Accordingly, the ACIA makes it clear that its
home/2010/02/25/business/Asean-investment-liberalisation-could-be-delayed-b-
30123351.html. As of this writing, six ASEAN Member-States have already ratified the
ACIA-Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and the Philippines. See
Table of ASEAN Treaties/Agreements and Ratifications, ASEAN SECRETARIAT,
http://www.aseansec.org/Ratification.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
168. ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.asean.
org/documents/FINAL-SIGNED-ACIA.pdf [hereinafter ACIA] (not yet in force). See Joint
Media Statement of the 42nd ASEAN Economic Ministers' (AEM) Meeting (Aug. 25,
2010), available at http://www.aseansec.org/25084.htm.
169. ASEAN SECRETARIAT, ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT AGREEMENT FACT
SHEET (2009), available at http://www.aseansec.org/Fact%20Sheet/AEC/2009-AEC-
024.pdf.
170. ACIA, supra note 168, art. 47(1).
171. Id. art. 1.
2011] 307
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
provisions apply to all ten ASEAN Member States, 172 to ensure uni-
form treatment and increased protection of covered investments in
the Southeast Asian region.173 The ACIA maintains the 1987
ASEAN IGA's guarantees of national treatment, 174 Most favored na-
tion (MFN) treatment, 175 fair and equitable treatment, 176 the prohibi-
tion against expropriation and the requirement of just compensation
for lawful expropriations. 177
At the same time, the ACIA abandons many of the problemat-
ic aspects of the 1987 ASEAN IGA. The ACIA definitions of "in-
vestments" and "covered investors" are consistent with the broader
definitions for such terms under the U.S. and German Model Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties. 178 The ACIA no longer follows the 1987
ASEAN IGA's strict definition of an investor company as a "corpo-
ration, partnership or other business association, incorporated or con-
stituted under the laws in force in the territory of any Contracting
Party wherein the place of effective management is situated."79 In-
stead, the ACIA transposes the element of management or business
operations in its denial of benefits clause, 180 which is worded similar-
ly to the denial of benefits clause under Article 17 of the Energy
Charter Treaty.
172. The ACIA provides for some special and differential treatment for newer ASEAN
Member States (mainly the CMLV countries), such as through technical assistance,
recognition of their commitments according to individual stages of development, among
others. Id. art. 23.
173. See Timothy G. Nelson, Investor-State Arbitration and Investment Treaty
Protection-The South-East Asian Angle, 28 AUSTL. RESOURCES & ENERGY L.J. 213, 213-
25 (2009).
174. ACIA, supra note 168, art. 5.
175. Id. art. 6.
176. Id. art. 11.
177. Id. art. 14.
178. Compare U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf, and GERMAN MODEL BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY (2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/investmenttreaties.htm, with
ACIA, supra note 168, arts. 3, 4(a), 4(c)-4(e).
179. Agreement Among the Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the
Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 1(2), Dec. 15,
1987, 27 I.L.M. 612, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12812.htm, [hereinafter 1987
ASEAN IGA] (emphasis added).
180. ACIA, supra note 168, arts. 19(1)(a)-(b).
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The ACIA also relaxes the 1987 ASEAN IGA's strict termi-
nology on the applicability of the treaty. The 1987 ASEAN IGA had
restricted covered investments only to government "approved" and
"registered" investments, 181 which the ACIA changed by defining a
"covered investment" as an investment in the territory of a Member
State or
of any other Member State in existence as of the date
of entry into force of this Agreement or established,
acquired, or expanded thereafter, and has been admit-
ted according to its laws, regulations, and national pol-
icies, and where applicable, specifically approved in
writing by the competent authority of a Member
State. 182
The ACIA also abandons the 1987 ASEAN IGA's confusing refer-
ence to investments as those "brought into the territory" of a Con-
tracting State, which had appeared to restrict the applicability of the
1987 ASEAN IGA only to investments that originate from ASEAN
investors. 183 Other new provisions of the ACIA include: guarantees
of compensation to investors in cases of strife (due to armed conflict
or civil strife or state of emergency);184 an expanded enumeration of
transfers relating to a covered investment;185 permitted measures that
181. 1987 ASEAN IGA, supra note 179, art. 11(1) ("This Agreement shall apply only to
investments brought into, derived from or directly connected with investments brought into
the territory of any Contracting Party by nationals or companies of any other Contracting
Party and which are specifically approved in writing and registered by the host country and
upon such conditions as it deems fit for the purposes of this Agreement."(emphasis added)).
182. ACIA, supra note 168, art. 4(a).
183. 1987 ASEAN IGA, supra note 179, art. 2(1) ("This Agreement shall apply only to
investments brought into, derived from or directly connected with investments brought into
the territory of any Contracting Party by nationals or companies of any other Contracting
Party and which are specifically approved in writing and registered by the host country and
upon such conditions as it deems fit for the purposes of this Agreement." (emphasis added)).
184. See ACIA, supra note 168, art. 12, which appears similarly-worded as Article 4(1)
of the 1980 Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT, Agreement between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, U.K.-Sri Lanka art. 4(1), Feb. 13, 1980, 1227 U.N.T.S. 19825, that provided
for compensation to investors for losses to investment suffered as a consequence of "war or
other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection, or riot."
See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award
and Dissenting Opinion (June 27, 1990), 6 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 526 (1991), 30 I.L.M. 577
(1991).
185. Compare ACIA, supra note 168, art. 13, with 1987 ASEAN IGA, supra note 179,
art. VII(1).
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host States may adopt to safeguard their respective balances-of-
payments; 186 and perhaps most importantly, general exceptions and
security exceptions provisions1 87 that appear wholly identical to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994's Articles
XX (General Exceptions) and XXI (Security Exceptions).
Unlike the 1987 ASEAN IGA, the ACIA now accommodates
other dispute resolution mechanisms apart from arbitration, such as
conciliation and consultation.1 88 Investors may submit to arbitration
any claims based on breach of ACIA obligations (on national treat-
ment, MFN treatment, senior management and board of directors,
treatment of investment, compensation in cases of strife, transfers,
expropriation and compensation) relating to the management, con-
duct, operation, sale or other disposition of a covered investment, for
which the investor has suffered loss or damage arising from such
breach. 189 At its own discretion, the investor may submit such claim
to any of the following institutions, in the alternative:
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the dis-
puting Member State, provided that such courts or
tribunals have jurisdiction over such claims; or
(b) under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules
of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, provided
that both the disputing Member State and the non-
disputing Member State are parties to the ICSID
Convention; or
(c) under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, pro-
vided that either of the disputing Member State or
the non-disputing Member State is a party to the
ICSID Convention; or
(d) under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or
(e) to the Regional Centre for Arbitration at Kuala
Lumpur or at any other regional centre for arbitra-
tion within ASEAN; or
(f) if the disputing parties agree, to any other arbitra-
tion institution.190
186. ACIA, supra note 168, art. 16.
187. Id. arts. 17-18.
188. Id. arts. 3-31.
189. Id. art. 32.
190. Id. art. 33.
310 49:268
ASEAN'S CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
The ACIA contains extensive provisions on the governing
law of the arbitration, the procedures for appointment of arbitrators
and the conduct of the arbitration, up to the issuance of the arbitral
award, 191 and also appears to apply the 1958 New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards to claims
submitted under the ACIA. 192 However, the ACIA also stresses that
"[e]ach Member State shall provide for the enforcement of an award
in its territory." 193 This stand-alone provision in the ACIA is unqual-
ified, and does not contain any reference to the 1958 New York Con-
vention's procedures and limited grounds for refusal of recognition
and enforcement. 194 This gap calls into question the actual scope of
judicial supervision retained by Southeast Asian national courts in re-
lation to arbitral awards arising from the ACIA.
It should be recalled that Contracting States to the 1958 New
York Convention have the express duty to "recognize an agreement
in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration
all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or
not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitra-
tion." 195 Courts of Contracting States have the duty to refer the par-
ties to arbitration "unless [they] find[] that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." 196 Contract-
ing States have the obligation to "recognize arbitral awards as bind-
ing and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid
down in the following articles." 97 Article V lists exclusive grounds
under which recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards may be
191. Id. arts. 33-41.
192. "New York Convention means the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, United States of America
on 10 June 1958." Id. art. 28(h). "Unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, the tribunal
shall determine the place of arbitration in accordance with the applicable arbitration rules,
provided that the place shall be in the territory of a State that is a party to the New York
Convention." Id. art. 36(5). "A claim that is submitted for arbitration under this Section
shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for purposes of
Article 1 of the New York Convention." Id. art. 41(8).
193. Id. art. 41(9).
194. Id. arts. 3-6.
195. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards art. 2(1), Jun. 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
196. Id. art. 2(3).
197. Id. art. 3.
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refused. Article VI entitles courts to adjourn decision on the en-
forcement of the award and may order the other party to give suitable
security if an application for vacatur or suspension of the award has
been made pursuant to Article V(1)(e). These common international
obligations for all Contracting States to the 1958 New York Conven-
tion build up a system of control mechanisms that uniformly deline-
ate the authority of courts and the prerogative of arbitrators. 198
The ACIA does not clearly indicate if ASEAN Member
States providing for enforcement of arbitral awards in their respective
territories have to follow the abovementioned control mechanisms of
the 1958 New York Convention. This can be potentially problemat-
ic, since some Southeast Asian national courts might rely on this gap
to undertake judicial review de novo of arbitral awards, and thus
reach into the intrinsic features of the awards and the arbitrators' dis-
position of the issues on the merits. The ACIA's provisions for Gen-
eral Exceptions also include a "public morals or public order" excep-
tion, 199 which could have entirely different municipal connotations
and jurisprudential understandings for various national courts in
Southeast Asia. The same ambiguity can exist for the ACIA's Secu-
rity Exceptions, where any Member State is not prevented from "tak-
ing any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests." 200 Significantly, the ACIA's wording of
both these provisions on General Exceptions and Security Exceptions
appears to have been largely adopted from another specialized treaty
regime, Articles XX (General Exceptions) and XXI (Security Excep-
tions) of the GATT 1994, as well as Article XIV of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 201 The international trade
law regime contains its own jurisprudence on the interpretation of
these exceptions. 202 While it would appear from the text of the ACIA
that the adaptation of trade law provisions is deliberate, 203 these un-
198. See W.M. REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 109-30 (1992).
199. ACIA, supra note 168, art. 17(1)(a).
200. Id. art. 18(b).
201. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 arts. XX, XXI, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 190 (1995); General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr. 15,
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 196 (1995).
202. See PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: A
COMMENTARY 185-86, 257-59 (2005); Andrew Emmerson, Conceptualizing Security
Exceptions: Legal Doctrine or Political Excuse?, 11 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 135, 135-54 (2008);
Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?,
52 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1287-96 (2003).
203. See ACIA, supra note 168, art. 17(2). Article 17(2) states:
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settled provisions of GATT Articles XX and XXI and GATS Article
XIV do not provide a consistent source of jurisprudential and legal
guidance for Southeast Asian national courts. In cases where these
exceptions are invoked, therefore, it is possible that some national
courts in Southeast Asia would avail themselves of the gap in the
language of the ACIA on enforcement of arbitral awards, or the in-
terpretive uncertainty underlying ACIA Articles 17 and 18, to under-
take a more extensive form of judicial review beyond the grounds in-
dicated in Article V of the 1958 New York Convention. National
courts' hybrid and disparate interpretations of these exceptions, with-
out reference to fellow Southeast Asian courts' judicial interpreta-
tions alongside the ACIA text and context, could thus undermine
ACIA legality and the objectives of ASEAN economic integration.
C. The Problem ofDiffuse or Insufficient Judicial Oversight
The actual reach of the vast and wide-ranging international
obligations assumed under the ASEAN Charter will ultimately de-
pend on the effectiveness and efficiency of Southeast Asian national
courts in adjudicating controversies arising from their respective
governments' (non)compliance with Charter-based or Charter-
incorporated international legal norms. How this tension is managed,
I submit, will be determinative of the success of the ASEAN Char-
ter's project of constitutionalization of international law. Can South-
east Asian national courts still separately undertake their own judicial
oversight powers on their respective governments without acknowl-
edging the larger consequences of their judicial decisions on the
Charter-based ASEAN communities? If a national court declines to
compel the government of an ASEAN Member State to comply with
ASEAN law, ASEAN Summit decisions or international law as em-
braced within the ASEAN Charter, can ASEAN realistically compel
compliance? Article 27(2) of the ASEAN Charter provides that
"[a]ny Member State affected by non-compliance with the findings,
recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute set-
tlement mechanism, may refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit for
a decision," while Article 20(4) of the ASEAN Charter indicates that
"[i]n the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance,
2. Insofar as measures affecting the supply of financial services are
concerned, paragraph 2 (Domestic Regulation) of the Annex on Financial
Services of the General Agreement on Trade in Services in Annex IB to
the WTO Agreement ("GATS") shall be incorporated into and form an
integral part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis.
Id.
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the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision." 204
The Charter, however, is silent on what such ASEAN Summit deci-
sions could entail in actual practice. Could these decisions impose
sanctions, declare duties to make reparations (analogous to conse-
quences of breaching international obligations under the Articles on
State Responsibility) or affect the membership status of the non-
complying ASEAN Member State? These vague references to
ASEAN Summit decisions (and the corresponding lack of categorical
substantive guidelines in the Charter) thus appear to subject the issue
of oversight more to political suasion than actual international legali-
ty.
Perhaps the most extreme example of this tension can be seen
from the contrast between the ASEAN Charter's deep commitment to
international human rights obligations and the unclear competence of
the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
(AICHR). The ASEAN Charter expressly incorporated as part of its
binding Principles sweeping duties of ASEAN Member States that
obligate them to observe "adherence to the rule of law, good govern-
ance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government"; 205
"respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of
human rights, and the promotion of social justice";206 and "upholding
the United Nations Charter and international law, including interna-
tional humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member
States." 207
Given these extensive commitments assumed by ASEAN, the
Terms of Reference for the AICHR vested it with the organizational
mandate, inter alia, to "protect human rights and fundamental free-
doms" and "uphold international human rights standards as pre-
scribed by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, and international human
rights instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties." 208
To fulfill this mandate, however, the AICHR was only created as a
"consultative body," with marginal implementing capacity to fulfill a
narrow set of functions. 209  Clearly, the literal enforcement of
204. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, arts. 20(4), 27(2).
205. Id. art. 2(2)(h).
206. Id. art. 2(2)(i).
207. Id. art. 2(2)().
208. See ASEAN SECRETARIAT, TERMS OF REFERENCE OF ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, cIs. 1.1, 1.6, available at http://www.aseansec.org/DOC-
TOR-AHRB.pdf.
209. Id. cl. 4. Clause 4 states:
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ASEAN Member States' international human rights commitments
would be a shared responsibility of Southeast Asian national gov-
ernments, as overseen by their respective national courts in specific
cases.
While national courts are indeed valuable actors in enforcing
international human rights obligations, 210 their enforcement abilities
4. Mandate and Functions
4.1. To develop strategies for the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms to complement the building of the
ASEAN Community;
4.2. To develop an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration with a view to
establishing a framework for human rights cooperation through
various ASEAN conventions and other instruments dealing with
human rights;
4.3. To enhance public awareness of human rights among the peoples of
ASEAN through education, research and dissemination of
information;
4.4. To promote capacity building for the effective implementation of
international human rights treaty obligations undertaken by
ASEAN Member States;
4.5. To encourage ASEAN Member States to consider acceding to and
ratifying international human rights instruments;
4.6. To promote the full implementation of ASEAN instruments related
to human rights;
4.7. To provide advisory services and technical assistance on human
rights matters to ASEAN sectoral bodies upon request;
4.8. To engage in dialogue and consultation with other ASEAN bodies
and entities associated with ASEAN, including civil society
organisations and other stakeholders, as provided for in Chapter V
of the ASEAN Charter;
4.9. To consult, as may be appropriate, with other national, regional and
international institutions and entities concerned with the promotion
and protection of human rights;
4.10.To obtain information from ASEAN Member States on the
promotion and protection of human rights;
4.11 .To develop common approaches and positions on human rights
matters of interest to ASEAN;
4.12.To prepare studies on thematic issues of human rights in ASEAN;
4.13.To submit an annual report on its activities, or other reports if
deemed necessary, to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting; and
4.14.To perform any other tasks as may be assigned to it by the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers Meeting.
Id.
210. See BENEDETTO CONFORTI & FRANCESCO FRANCIONI, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS (1997); Michael Kirby, Domestic Courts and
International Human Rights Law: The Ongoing Judicial Conversation, 27 NETH. Q. OF
HuM. RTs. 291, 291-308 (2009). But see HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN
GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALS:
TEXT AND CASES 42-57 (2008).
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are also contingent on their relative institutional strengths within their
respective countries. Although Southeast Asian legal systems are
well-used to pluralist legal orders and normative transplantations, 211
contemporary Southeast Asian courts do not exhibit uniformity or
similarity in their degree of receptiveness to international law, more
so their reference or use of comparative foreign sources. Many
Southeast Asian states have not ratified the Rome Statute of the In-
temational Criminal Court.212 The new ASEAN members such as
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are not mature democracies
in the same vein as the original five ASEAN Member States (Malay-
sia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore). 213 The
comparative jurisprudence on international law continues to be thinly
reported from Southeast Asian national courts, more so on intema-
tional human rights issues. It therefore remains to be seen if modem
Southeast Asian courts can rigorously discharge their gatekeeping
functions in the enforcement of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN laws
and numerous international laws embraced by the ASEAN Charter.
If indeed, as some scholars have recently observed, international law
is moving towards an "Eastphalia" 214 where international law now in-
fuses Asian governance, it is all the more important that ASEAN ad-
dress the problem of diffuse or insufficient judicial oversight to keep
Southeast Asian states in the Charter-based ASEAN along this
"Eastphalian" path.
Part II has attempted to expose some common structural chal-
lenges to the constitutionalization of international law in the Charter-
based ASEAN. In the Conclusion, I propose that this project of con-
stitutionalization of international law in ASEAN must come to terms
with the realities of effective decision. Even as reforms and institu-
tions are continuously being built into the new, Charter-based
ASEAN, Southeast Asian constituencies must exhaust Charter pro-
211. Andrew Harding, Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South East Asia:
Making Sense of the "Nomic Din ", in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 199 (David Nelken and
Johannes Fees eds., 2001). See also John R. Schmidhauser, Legal Imperialism: Its
Enduring Impact in Colonial and Post-Colonial Judicial Systems, 13 INT'L POL. Sc. REv. 3,
321-34 (1992).
212. See Valeriane Toon, International Criminal Court: Reservations of Non-State
Parties in Southeast Asia, 26 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 218 (2004).
213. See David Martin Jones, Security and Democracy: The ASEAN Charter and the
Dilemmas ofRegionalism in South-East Asia, 84 INT'L AFF. 735, 741-56 (2008).
214. See David P. Fidler, Introduction: Eastphalia Emerging? Asia, International Law,
and Global Governance, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-12 (2010); Tom Ginsburg,
Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 27-45
(2010).
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cesses to exact rules-based conduct from ASEAN Member States.
International legal compliance cannot be left in stasis during
ASEAN's institutional transition.
IV. CONCLUSION: FROM CONSTITUTIONALIZATION TO
CONSTITUTIVE DECISION-ASEAN CHARTER PROCESSES AND
THE RULE OF LAW
It would be inaccurate to say that ASEAN only began its in-
ternational legal existence through the binding force and effect of the
ASEAN Charter. As Simon Chesterman rightly held, "even before
adopting the Charter, ASEAN was certainly a permanent association
of states, with lawful objects, equipped with at least rudimentary or-
gans from the outset, growing into a Secretariat over time."215 How-
ever, it is another matter altogether to determine ASEAN's political
and economic salience as a Charter-based organization of States
moving towards integration in various functional areas. As I dis-
cussed in Part I, the Charter-based ASEAN appears to espouse some
functional constitutionalization of international law, albeit incom-
pletely. Certainly, a Charter-based ASEAN has generated a form of
normative explosion in innumerable areas of Southeast Asian gov-
ernance, with forty years worth of ASEAN instruments, treaties and
agreements carried over and given full effect in the new ASEAN
Charter era. The Charter-based ASEAN has also boldly set its sights
on the incorporation of settled bodies of conventional and customary
international law, international human rights law and multilateral
trade rules within the framework of ASEAN policymaking. Without
parallel institutional adaptation at pace with the normative explosion,
therefore, it remains an open question if the Charter-based ASEAN
can fully realize all of the Charter's more deeply internationalist Pur-
poses and Principles.
One way of explaining the lag between norms and institutions
in today's Charter-based ASEAN is to recognize that the Charter still
reflects a lingering tension between ASEAN's move towards interna-
tionalism, while retaining a marked emphasis on the principles of
sovereign independence and non-interference. Much has been writ-
ten about ASEAN "exceptionalism" or inutility due to these princi-
ples,216 but it must also be stressed that many of ASEAN's accom-
215. Chesterman, supra note 3, at 205.
216. See, e.g., John Arendshorst, The Dilemma ofNon-Interference: Myanmar, Human
Rights, and the ASEAN Charter, 8 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTs. 1, 102-21 (2009); Lee Jones,
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plishments in the last forty years in security, trade and intergovern-
mental administrative cooperation are attributable to the fact that the-
se principles endured within the Southeast Asian diplomatic lexi-
con. 217 It is easier to accept these conflicting realities once one
probes the constructivist history behind the creation of a "Southeast
Asian" region.218 Unlike the predominantly shared religious, politi-
cal, economic, social and cultural histories of Europe, Southeast Asia
was initially a fictive construct of states that had considerably differ-
ent colonial and postcolonial experiences, political struggles, eco-
nomic power, linguistic traditions and religions. Southeast Asian
states have had less than a century of re-experienced political sover-
eignty after their independence from imperial fetters-it was not co-
incidental that Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 Bandung Principles of mutu-
al non-aggression, non-interference and sovereign equality of states
resound distinctly from ASEAN's 1976 TAC and 1967 Bangkok
Declaration (and to some extent, the ASEAN Charter).219 In a region
whose very identity appears more a product of choice,220 rather than
of inseparably intertwined histories, 221 it is not difficult to see why
Southeast Asian states would still keep principles of non-
interference, respect for national sovereignty, as well as the musha-
warah and mufakat concepts in the ASEAN Charter,222 even as the
Charter embraces more internationalist principles and norms.
The litmus test for international legality in a Charter-based
ASEAN depends on the calibrated interpretation of the abovemen-
tioned principles in the implementation of ASEAN law and interna-
tional law. Implementation will depend on the concerted efforts of
ASEAN's Burma Policy: From Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement, 4
ASIAN SEC. 3, 271-93 (2008); The Limits ofPoliteness, EcoNoMIST, Feb. 28, 1998, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/114305.
217. Robin Ramcharan, ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained, 22
CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 60, 86 (2000).
218. Desierto, supra note 4, 389, 413-19.
219. The 1954 Bandung Principles were authored by Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En
Lai, during the historic African-Asian People's Conference. See GEORGE McTuRNAN
KAHIN, THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE, BANDUNG, INDONESIA 1955, 29 (1970).
220. One need not look far from the ASEAN Charter text to see the purposeful forging
of the Southeast Asian identity and its visible symbols, such as the ASEAN motto of "One
Vision, One Identity, One Community," the ASEAN flag, the ASEAN emblem and anthem,
ASEAN Day, as well as the establishment of a Committee of Permanent Representatives to
ASEAN. See ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, arts. 1(14), 2(2)(1), 12, 35-40.
221. See AMITAV ACHARYA, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA 26-31, 83-93 (2000).
222. ASEAN Charter, supra note 5, arts. 2(2)(a)-(g).
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the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Community Councils and other
Charter bodies, with national governments and domestic courts.
Given the institutional structure and decision-making processes of
ASEAN that I have described, it should be apparent that the authori-
tative and constitutive bases for ASEAN decisions are defined not
just by the formal legal instruments that comprise forty years' worth
of ASEAN law, the continued issuance of ASEAN "legislation"
through the ASEAN Summit decisions and new treaties being con-
cluded by ASEAN states, but also from the operational practices or
"operational codes" 2 23 of States and non-state actors, on established
intergovernmental networks as well as non-governmental cooperative
frameworks.224 The problems of incorporation (or lack of direct ef-
fect), hybrid interpretations and diffuse or insufficient judicial over-
sight persist because the formal expressions of "ASEAN Law"
(through the Charter, ASEAN treaties and agreements and ASEAN
Summit decisions) outpace the actual operational practices, powers
and/or codes of key ASEAN actors-the ASEAN Summit and the
fabric of ASEAN Charter bodies, as well as the Member States and
their respective national governments and courts.
While constitutionalization has many analytical uses (espe-
cially in locating the point at which ASEAN's "soft" laws and regu-
lations harden into firm international obligations of ASEAN Member
States under the new Charter-based system), it is still necessary to
cultivate a deeper understanding of the ASEAN institutional practices
and beliefs that translate ASEAN norms and decisions into effective
operational policies. It is in this sense that the structural considera-
tions I have laid out in this article only offer a starting point in the
analysis of ASEAN decision-making and the concept of legality
within a Charter-based ASEAN. From a normative standpoint, the
ASEAN Charter exemplifies an ideological project towards "thicker"
constitutionalization of international law. This in itself has a revolu-
tionary potential for entrenching the rule of law across all of South-
east Asia's diverse polities. The impediments of incorporation, hy-
brid interpretations and diffuse judicial oversight must be resolved in
order to transform constitutionalized international law into effective
ASEAN decisions and policies. To prevent reducing the Charter to a
future rhetoric of nominal (and not actual) international legality, the
223. See W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code, 3 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 229, 230-38 (1977).
224. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-
92 (2002).
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design, mandate and powers of ASEAN institutions must evolve to
embrace and realize the new Charter ideologies.
